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Shareholder democracy is on the rise. But will that democracy improve the
fortunes of non-shareholder "stakeholders" such as employees, creditors,
consumers, and the community? Many scholars argue that the legitimacy of
shareholder democracy may turn on the answer to that question. This
Article provides such an answer. Over the past few years, shareholders
have launched an aggressive campaign to increase their voting power with
the corporation-seeking to make the corporation more "democratic." As
part of their campaign, shareholders have sought to create a majority vote
system for annual elections, to eliminate multi-year terms for directors, and
to gain the ability to nominate director candidates on the corporation's
ballot. Such efforts not only have garnered record levels of shareholder
support, but also have prompted corporations, legislatures, and judges to
alter corporate governance structures. Shareholders' quest for increased
power and its seeming success have sparked intense debate between those
who believe shareholder democracy is necessary to increase accountability
and those who believe increased shareholder power will be ineffective and
undermine corporate value. One of the most outspoken proponents of
shareholder democracy, Harvard Professor Lucian Bebchuk, argues that
one potentially devastating critique of shareholder democracy is the
presumption that increased shareholder power will be detrimental to
stakeholders because it will force directors and officers to focus on profits
without regard to other corporate constituents. This Article rejects that
presumption. Instead, it insists that shareholders not only have interests
that align with stakeholders, but also introduces empirical evidence
suggesting that shareholders will use their increased voting power to
advance the interests of stakeholders. However, this Article acknowledges
that shareholder democracy may benefit some stakeholders more than
others. Nevertheless, by undermining one of the most lethal critiques
against shareholder empowerment, this Article makes a vital contribution to
the emerging debate regarding the propriety of shareholder democracy.
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Recently shareholders have launched an aggressive campaign to increase
their voting power within the corporation. For example, shareholders have
filed resolutions seeking to require corporations to elect directors every year,
and in 2006 such resolutions garnered an average of 67% of the shareholder
vote.1 Shareholders also have filed a record number of resolutions aimed at
requiring corporations to adopt a majority vote standard in director
elections.2 In 2006, such resolutions received an average shareholder vote of
almost 50%. 3 Like annual elections for all board members, many
shareholders believe a majority vote standard will make their voting power
more effective, and thus give them greater control over corporate affairs.
Shareholders' efforts to increase their voting power-referred to by some
as "shareholder democracy"--are motivated by shareholders' desire to make
corporate officers and directors more accountable to them. Indeed, many
shareholders believe that accounting and other corporate governance
scandals were caused, at least in part, by a lack of sufficient director and
officer accountability. Then too, shareholders have grown increasingly
dissatisfied with managers' failure to curb rising executive compensation
packages. In the shareholders' view, if managers were more accountable to
shareholders, they would be more likely to respond to shareholder demands
to curtail executive pay schemes. Ultimately, many shareholders and their
proponents believe that expanding shareholder democracy will lead to greater
managerial accountability, thereby curbing managers' abuses of authority
and ensuring that managers pay heed to shareholders' concerns.
Shareholders' efforts, and the potential that they may prove successful,
have sparked intense debate regarding the propriety of expanding shareholder
power, and hence potentially shifting authority from corporate officers and
directors to the corporation's shareholders. Harvard Professor Lucian
Bebchuk, one of the most outspoken proponents of shareholder democracy,
argues that increasing shareholder power would improve corporate
governance and enhance shareholder value.4 UCLA Professor Stephen
Bainbridge maintains that the current regime of limited shareholder power is
1 See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2006 POSTSEASON REPORT:
SPOTLIGHT ON EXECUTIVE PAY AND BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY 19 (2006),
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/2006PostSeasonReportFNAL.pdf [hereinafter 2006
PROXY SEASON REPORT] (finding that in 2006, proposals seeking corporations to
eliminate their staggered boards garnered an average of 66.8% of the shareholder vote).
2 See id. at 16 (finding that in the first half of 2006, proposals seeking corporations
to adopt a majority vote standard outnumbered all other proposals submitted and
averaged 47.7% of the shareholder vote).
3 See id.
4 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARv. L.
REV. 833, 836 (2005).
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preferable because it allows for a system of centralized decision-making,
which is the most cost-effective and efficient means of governing corporate
affairs. 5
This Article does not focus on the appropriateness of increased
shareholder power per se, but instead analyzes the likely impact of that
increase on corporate "stakeholders"-employees, customers, creditors,
suppliers and other groups impacted by the corporation.6 In fact, one
objection to increasing shareholder power is that such an increase would
force directors and officers to focus solely on profits to the detriment of
stakeholders. 7 Bebchuk contends that this stakeholder-centered argument is
very important because it has the potential to boost significantly the
legitimacy of the case against shareholder power.8 This is because such an
argument shifts the debate from a power struggle between shareholders and
managers to a power struggle between shareholders and all other corporate
constituents, thereby bolstering the appeal and seeming legitimacy of
management's position.9 Bebchuk has responded to the stakeholder-based
argument by insisting that managers' interests are not aligned with those of
stakeholders, and thus insulating managers from increased shareholder power
would enable them to advance their own self-serving goals at the expense of
shareholders and stakeholders alike.' 0 This Article approaches this concern
more affirmatively, and seeks to ascertain not only whether shareholders'
interests align with stakeholders, but also whether we should expect
shareholders to use their increased power in a manner that benefits
stakeholders.
To this end, this Article rejects the presumption that expanding
shareholder power will have a negative impact on stakeholders, and instead
argues that at least some shareholders will use their increased power to
advance stakeholders' concerns. Such an argument recognizes that
shareholders have divergent concerns and some of those concerns parallel the
5 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1746 (2005) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]; Stephen
M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REv. 601,
624 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Shareholder Voting Rights].
6 This Article appreciates that not all stakeholders have similar interests. Hence, this
Article argues that shareholder power may benefit some stakeholders more than others.
See infra Part ll.D. I would like to thank Stephen Bainbridge for highlighting the
importance of this distinction to my argument.
7 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 304-05 (1999).
8 Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 912.
9 See id.
10 See id. at 909-11.
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interests of many stakeholders, particularly employees, customers, and the
broader community.'1 Moreover, shareholders can and do use their voting
power to advance stakeholder-oriented issues. Thus, the available empirical
evidence reveals that shareholder activism as it relates to stakeholder matters
has increased along with activism on more traditional corporate governance
matters. 12 Such evidence suggests that shareholders will use their increased
power to continue their advocacy on behalf of stakeholders. Then too, a
recent study on the impact of shareholder voting related to stakeholder
concerns suggests that shareholders play a critical role in focusing corporate
attention on stakeholder-related issues as well as building legitimacy for
those issues. 13 This study suggests that increased shareholder power may
ensure that shareholders can more effectively influence long-term corporate
policy as it relates to certain stakeholders. Thus, far from threatening the
interests of stakeholders, shareholder democracy may enable shareholders to
increase their advocacy on behalf of stakeholders.
This Article does recognize that not all stakeholders have interests that
align with those of shareholders, and hence it is likely that shareholder
empowerment will benefit some stakeholders more than others. Indeed, while
shareholders often advance the concerns of groups such as employees and
consumers, shareholders rarely focus on issues of concern to creditors.
Despite this differential impact, the fact that many shareholders do embrace
and support issues that impact a wide variety of stakeholders rebuts the
prevailing presumption that shareholder democracy represents a negative
development for all stakeholders.
To be sure, there are some factors that may undermine the extent to
which increased shareholder power will benefit even those stakeholders
whose interests coincide with shareholders' interests. Most notably, the types
of shareholders most likely to use their increased power may be shareholders
with short-term interests at odds with stakeholders. Hence, both Bainbridge
and Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine point out that many of the most
activist shareholders are those with short-term agendas. 14 If power is likely to
reside in their hands, then stakeholders will not benefit from that power.
However, while it is true that shareholders with short-term horizons-such as
11 See infra Part II.A.
12 See infra Part II.B.
13 See W. Trexler Proffitt, Jr. & Andrew Spicer, Shaping the Shareholder Activism
Agenda: Institutional Investors and Global Social Issues, 4 STRATEGIC ORG. 165 (2006)
(assessing trends in shareholder support of various stakeholder issues based on
shareholder proposal data for a thirty-five year period).
14 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 5, at 1754; Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk's Solution for
Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1759, 1771 (2006).
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hedge funds-have been extremely active recently, shareholders who
promote stakeholder concerns also have been very active. As a consequence,
shareholders concerned with stakeholder issues have managed to advance
those issues despite the activism of shareholders with contrary agendas.
Moreover, these stakeholder-oriented shareholders have a history of activism
and hence may be more likely to sustain their activity over the long run. This
observation suggests that not all shareholder power will have negative
repercussions for stakeholders; rather, that power in the hands of some
shareholders could be problematic and should be monitored.
A second concern posed by increasing shareholder power is that
shareholders may use their enhanced power to advance personal or political
agendas as opposed to issues that benefit the corporation as a whole.15 To be
clear, while this Article contends that corporations should address the
concerns of stakeholders, this Article also insists that corporations should
address only those concerns that enhance the long-term health of the
corporation or otherwise are viewed as important to the shareholder class. In
other words, there are certain social or stakeholder concerns that corporate
officers and directors should consider in carrying out their duties, and in
many cases shareholders support a corporate focus on those concerns. 16
Moreover, it is these concerns, and not narrow self-interested ones, that
should not be ignored in the debate regarding shareholder democracy. 17 As a
consequence, it is particularly problematic if conferring increased power on
individual groups of shareholders increases the potential that such groups
will seek to maximize their own self-interest without regard to the
corporation as a whole. 18 On the one hand, this potential may be an
inevitable by-product of increased shareholder power. On the other hand, this
problem may be less of a concern for stakeholder-oriented investors because
shareholders promoting narrow interests are the group who has experienced
the most difficulty with advancing their agenda. Indeed, empirical evidence
reveals that corporate managers are most likely to challenge their efforts and
15 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 5, at 1756 (noting concern that
rent-seeking institutions may use their increased power to bargain for private benefits).
16 See infra Part II.B (explaining shareholder support for stakeholder concerns).
17 To this end, this Article maintains that managers have a responsibility to
maximize corporate value, which generally includes attending to the interests of
shareholders and non-shareholders. However, there are settings pursuant to which it is not
possible to advance the interests of both shareholders and stakeholders, and hence
managers must choose between the two. In those instances, it is often appropriate for
managers to choose to advance the interests of shareholders. However, if a sufficient
number of shareholders believe that management should favor some stakeholder
interests, then managerial action on such stakeholders' behalf would be legitimate.
18 See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53
UCLA L. REv. 561, 577 (2006) (noting potential for increased rent-seeking behavior).
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that the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) is most likely to
support those challenges. 19 Moreover, such groups experience the greatest
level of skepticism from other investors. 20 As a result, these investors'
success stems from their ability to overcome these hurdles by framing their
concerns in a manner that appeals to other investors.21 Hence, while
increased shareholder power may produce a system under which all investors
are more likely to pursue their own personal agenda, stakeholders may be the
group least likely to experience success with that strategy. Thus, while this
concern is important, it may not undermine the ability of shareholders to
serve as allies for advancing stakeholder issues beneficial to the entire
corporate enterprise.
Part I of this Article discusses some of the recent areas of shareholder
activism, with a particular focus on shareholder voting. Part II outlines the
stakeholder-centered objections to that activism, and then discusses the ways
in which shareholders' interests may dovetail with those of stakeholders, and
as a result, why shareholders may have an interest in advancing the concerns
of stakeholders. Part III then examines factors that may limit the extent to
which increased shareholder power will benefit stakeholders and addresses
whether those factors can be overcome. Part IV concludes by pointing out the
importance of stakeholders to the debate regarding shareholder democracy.
In fact, while debate rages about the propriety of increasing shareholder
power, the empirical evidence reveals that shareholders have experienced
success in their quest for increased power. And hence the debate may be
moot: increased shareholder power in some form has become the new
corporate governance reality. If this is accurate, then stakeholders and their
advocates must assess whether and to what extent that power can be
harnessed for their benefit. To that end, this Article begins the process of
examining how shareholder democracy can be beneficial for all corporate
constituents.
I. THE NEW CAMPAIGN FOR SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY
A. Some Fundamentals of Shareholder Voting and Participation
Shareholder voting represents one of the principal ways in which
shareholders can exercise voice within the corporation. Shareholders are the
only group granted the right to vote on corporate affairs. 22 Although that
19 See infra Part III.C.
20 See id.
21 See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(k) (2005).
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fight is limited to voting in the election of directors and on certain
fundamental transactions such as mergers or dissolutions, 23 courts view this
voting right as fundamental. 24
The widely dispersed nature of public shareholders means that
shareholders cast their vote by proxy rather than in person. Federal law,
commonly referred to as the federal proxy rules, governs the solicitation of
shareholder proxies and requires that any solicitation of proxies be
accompanied with a proxy statement containing information on the matters to
be voted.25 Hence, public corporations must distribute proxy statements to
shareholders for every election of directors and any other matter on which
shareholders must vote.
Federal law enables shareholders to place proposals on the corporation's
proxy statement related to annual elections. Specifically, Rule 14a-8 of the
proxy rules requires that the corporation include in its proxy statement
proposals of shareholders and provide some means by which other
shareholders can vote on the proposals, so long as shareholders meet certain
procedural requirements.26 Most often, shareholder proposals take the form
of recommendations, and hence are non-binding. Rule 14a-8 also permits a
corporation to exclude a shareholder proposal and sets forth various grounds
upon which such exclusions can be made. 27 Some grounds for exclusion
include that the proposal relates to a matter of ordinary business operations,
that the company has substantially implemented the proposal, or that the
proposal relates to an election for directors.2 8 When a corporation seeks to
exclude a proposal, it must submit its reasons for exclusion to the SEC's
staff. If the SEC's staff believes that the submitted reasons are consistent
with Rule 14a-8, it will issue a "no-action" letter, signaling the SEC's
23 See, e.g., id. §§ 251(c), 275(c) (mergers and dissolution, respectively).
24 See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting
that the shareholder franchise represents a critical underpinning of corporate power);
Stokes v. Cont'l Trust Co., 78 N.E. 1090, 1093 (N.Y. 1906) (noting that shareholders'
power to vote is vital).
25 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2006).
26 Id. § 240.14a-8. The Rule has several procedural requirements, including
requirements regarding the number of shares a shareholder must hold in order to submit a
proposal, proper notice, and limits on the number of proposals submitted. Id. § 240.14a-
8(a).
27 Id. § 240.14a-8(i).
28Id. §240.14a-8(i)(7), (i)(8), (i)(10). For a discussion of other substantive
exclusions, see Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment
in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REv. 879, 890-92 (1994).
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decision to take no action against the corporation if it decides to exclude a
particular shareholder proposal.29
This shareholder proposal process represents one of the only formal
mechanisms available for shareholders not only to initiate dialogue, but also
to potentially initiate corporate programs or policies on a given issue. As
such, that process represents a critical component of shareholder activism.
The next section will demonstrate the manner in which shareholders have
used the proposal process to increase their voting power within the
corporation.
B. Elements of the Campaign
Concerns about managerial abuses of power and managers' seeming
inability to stem the rise in executive pay have spurred shareholders to search
for mechanisms that would increase their ability to influence corporate
affairs. This section focuses on three of the most publicized efforts to
enhance shareholder power: majority voting, board declassification, and
shareholder access to the proxy.30
1. Majority Rules?
The 2004 director election at the Walt Disney Co. (Disney) galvanized
shareholders' campaign for majority voting. Shareholders at Disney wanted
to convey their displeasure at Michael Eisner, who was then Disney's CEO
and chairman of the board of directors. Believing that Disney needed a
second-in-command, Eisner orchestrated the hire f Michael Ovitz as
Disney's first president.31 However, problems emerged with Ovitz's job
29 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j) (2006); see also Palmiter, supra note 28, at 880-81,
904-05.
30 To be sure, these are not the only issues that have received significant shareholder
support within the past few years. For example, shareholders have submitted and
supported a significant number of proposals calling for the elimination of supermajority
vote rules as well as the separation of the CEO and board chair positions. See 2006
PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 19. Shareholders also have focused on issues
aimed at tackling rising executive compensation, calling for corporations to link
executive pay to performance. See id Shareholders also have requested that companies
allow them to give an advisory opinion on executive pay. Aflac, Inc. became the first
American company to implement such a rule, while Congress is considering a so-called
"say on pay" bill. See Kevin Drawbaugh, Soaring Executive Pay Meets Reforms,
REUTERS, Mar. 9, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN2427533920070311;
Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Score One for Dissent: Aflac to be P' U.S. Firm to Allow
Advisory Votes on Pay, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2007, at DO1 (noting that shareholders at
fifty companies would be voting on "say on pay" proposals).
31 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 352 (Del. Ch. 1998).
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performance and Disney terminated Ovitz after only fourteen months of
employment. 32 Pursuant to his employment agreement, Ovitz received over
$140 million in severance compensation. 33 Shareholders' outrage over such a
lucrative severance package spurred numerous lawsuits. 34 Such outrage also
prompted shareholders to organize a "vote no" campaign against Eisner in an
effort to block his re-election to the board.35 The campaign was very
successful, resulting in 45% of shareholders withholding votes against
Eisner.36 Such a percentage represented one of the largest no votes in recent
history. 37
32 See id.
33 See id. (explaining no-fault termination agreement).
34 See id. at 362 (granting motion to dismiss shareholder claims related to breach of
fiduciary duty for failing to properly scrutinize Ovitz's compensation package); Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (affirming in part and reversing in part the chancery
decision). After this reversal, the Delaware Supreme Court essentially affirmed the lower
court's decision, but only for the limited purpose of allowing shareholders to amend their
complaint in order to put forth a waste claim. When shareholders brought another suit in
2003 after Enron and related governance scandals, the Delaware Chancery Court did not
dismiss the case and instead censured the board for its conduct. See In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003). Ultimately, the Delaware
Supreme Court ruled against the shareholders, finding that while the directors' lack of
attention to corporate affairs failed to satisfy best practices, it did not constitute a breach
of the directors' and officers' fiduciary duty.
35 The first "vote no" campaign at Disney occurred in 1997 when shareholders first
sought to express their outrage regarding Ovitz's severance and the new employment
contract for Michael Eisner. See Lori B. Marino, Executive Compensation and the
Misplaced Emphasis on Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
1205, 1216 (1999). In that election, shareholders withheld 15% of their vote against five
directors and 8% of their vote against Eisner's new contract. See id. at 1216; Stewart J.
Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism
by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1073 (1998). At that time, Ovitz's severance
package was estimated to be between $19 to $90 million. See Marino, supra, at 1216.
The Delaware Chancery Court revised the estimated value to $140 million. In re Walt
Disney Co., Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 350 (Del. Ch. 1998).
36 See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2004 POSTSEASON REPORT: A NEW
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WORLD: FROM CONFRONTATION TO CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE
5, http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/2004ISSPSR.pdf [hereinafter 2004 PROXY SEASON
REPORT] (noting that the initial tally calculated the withhold percentage at 42%). Within
hours of the tally, Disney removed Eisner from his position as board chair and replaced
him with George Mitchell. See id. Some six months later, amidst continued shareholder
pressure, Eisner resigned his position as CEO. Eisner announced his resignation on the
twentieth anniversary of his employment with Disney. See id. at 5.
37 It is believed that the highest withheld vote occurred at Federated Department
Stores, Inc., the national retail operator of Macy's and Bloomingdale's. Although it was
not the target of an actual campaign, its refusal to implement majority voting caused
shareholders at Federated Department Stores, Inc. to withhold 61% of their votes from
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However, this campaign highlighted the fact that the current voting
regime made it difficult for shareholders to impact election outcomes, and
hence hold directors accountable for actions about which they disagreed. 38
Indeed, the default rule in the vast majority of states is that directors are
elected by a plurality of the votes cast. 39 Hence, plurality is the default rule in
Delaware, the state of incorporation for most public companies. 40 Similarly,
the Model Business Corporation Act (the MBCA), adopted by some twenty-
four states, embraces a plurality default rule.41
As a result, most shareholders elect directors under a plurality system.
That system means that a person wins a director election so long as she
four directors up for re-election. See 2004 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 36, at 9;
Andrew R. Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say
Yes? Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions, 60 Bus. LAW. 23, 51 (2004). Another
highly publicized "vote no" campaign launched in 2004 involved Safeway, Inc. However,
managers at Safeway were able to avoid a large percentage of withheld votes by
implementing a variety of corporate governance measures prior to election day. See 2004
PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 36, at 5 (noting Safeway's implementation of
measures that would enhance board independence and ensure that shareholder resolutions
that secured a majority vote were implemented). Instead, shareholders only withheld 17%
of their votes from one director. See id,
38 To be sure, the fact that Disney shareholders' "vote no" campaign resulted in the
removal of Eisner as chairman, and later CEO, may suggest that shareholders already
have the ability to remove directors from office and hence hold them accountable for
their actions. The campaign's success suggests that, as a practical matter, corporations
will not ignore actions that receive a significant portion of shareholder support. Thus,
rather than highlighting a deficiency, the shareholders' ultimate success can be
interpreted as a signal that shareholders can have success without garnering the votes
necessary to remove a director from office or otherwise securing the ability to
affirmatively remove a director from office. Hence, altering the default rule may appear
unnecessary. Bebchuk would disagree. Indeed, his study on corporate responsiveness to
shareholder support of board declassification suggests that corporations do feel free to
ignore shareholder votes, even when they receive an overwhelming amount of
shareholder support. See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 855. In this regard, some requirement
is necessary to ensure that corporations respond to shareholder calls for action.
39 Indeed, only four states (Alaska, Illinois, Missouri, and New Mexico) mandate
majority voting, while two states (Alabama and Pennsylvania) make majority voting the
default rule. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR
ELECTIONS, at 4-5 n.7 (last updated Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.ngelaw.com/
files/upload/majoritycallen_020707.pdf. This is in contrast to other countries, such as
the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, where some form of majority voting is the
default rule. See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 18. In Canada, plurality
voting is the default rule. However, like the United States, pressure to alter the voting
structure in Canada has caused many corporations to adopt some form of majority voting.
See id. at 17 (discussing Canadian campaign for majority vote elections).
40 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2005).
41 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.28(a) (2002).
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receives the most votes cast for her, without regard to votes cast against her
or withheld. Theoretically, then, even if 99% of shareholders had withheld
their votes against Eisner, he would have been victorious because all he
needed was one vote cast in his favor. The plurality system suggests that
nominees in an uncontested election are virtually guaranteed to be elected.
By raising the possibility that a majority of shareholders would withhold
their votes from a director nominee, Disney highlighted the fact that such a
vote could ultimately prove ineffective, thereby spurring calls for
corporations to adopt a majority vote default rule.
Implementation of a majority vote regime, however, is not without its
complications. First, adopting such a system does not guarantee the removal
of a director who fails to receive a majority of shareholder votes. State laws
provide that a director who fails to receive sufficient votes for reelection
continues in office until a successor is duly elected. 42 This "holdover rule"
means that a director who fails to receive a majority vote would remain in
office until her successor is elected or she is otherwise removed. The
holdover rule appears to nullify the impact of majority voting. To address the
problems generated by this rule, shareholder advocates have suggested that
corporations couple any majority vote regime with a provision requiring the
resignation of a nominee who failed to receive a majority vote.43 Second,
implementing a majority vote system could result in a failed election. From
this perspective, if such a rule governs contested elections, it is possible that
no one candidate will receive a majority of the vote and, consequently, that
no director will be effectively elected. Indeed, the plurality system was
adopted to guard against failed elections. A change in that system requires
attention to this problem. Third, the potential that a majority vote regime
could result in the removal of directors raises concerns regarding whether the
remaining board will satisfy listing standards or other rules regarding board
qualifications. Indeed, federal law and listing standards require that a
majority of members of a board as well as the members of certain
committees are independent directors.44 If a majority vote standard results in
42 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.05(e) (2002).
43 See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, MAJORITY ELECTIONS: QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS ON ISS 2006 VOTING POLICY 2 (Dec. 2005),
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/FAQMVPolicy2006.pdf [hereinafter MAJORITY
ELECTIONS].
44See Sarbanes-Oxley § 301 (2002), amending Section 1OA of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (requiring a majority of the audit
committee to be independent); see also NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual
§§ 303A.07(b) (2004) (requiring audit committee independence), 303A.01 (2003)
(requiring that a majority of the board be independent), and 303A.04(a) (2004) (requiring
that all nominating committee members be independent), available at
http://www.nyse.com/lcm/lcmsection.html; NASDAQ, Inc., The NASDAQ Manual:
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the removal of a corporation's independent directors, it could adversely
affect the corporation's compliance with these standards.
Because of these and other concerns, some corporations responded to
shareholder calls for greater voice in director elections with measures that
fell short of majority voting. In June 2005, Pfizer, Inc. (Pfizer) adopted a
policy now referred to as "plurality plus." 45 Under such a policy, Pfizer did
not alter its plurality vote default rule. However, Pfizer amended its charter
to require a director to tender her resignation if she receives a majority of
withheld votes.46 Pfizer's board would then have up to three months to
determine whether to accept such resignation.47 This rule enables
corporations to address any negative consequences associated with
shareholders' attempted removal of particular directors. By the end of 2005,
several other companies, including Circuit City Stores, Inc., Walt Disney
Co., Microsoft Corp., and Office Depot, Inc., had adopted policies similar to
Pfizer.48 These policies allowed corporations to retain the default rule of
plurality while providing shareholders some greater ability to control election
outcomes.
Yet shareholders and shareholder advisory services did not
enthusiastically embrace these alternative provisions. Indeed, Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS), one of the most influential proxy advisory
services, indicated that implementing a plurality plus procedure did not
necessarily constitute a sufficient response to shareholders. 49 Instead, ISS
Marketplace Rules §§ 4350(d) (requiring audit committee independence), and 4350(c)
(2004) (requiring that all compensation committee members, nominating committee
members, and a majority of the board be independent) (2004), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/MarketplaceRules.pdf.
45 See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2005 POSTSEASON REPORT:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT A CROSSROADS 10 (2005), http://www.issproxy.com/
pdf/2005PostSeasonReportFINAL.pdf [hereinafter 2005 PROXY SEASON REPORT].
46 See id.
47 See ALLEN, supra note 39, at 164. The Pfizer board is required to disclose its
decision-making process and decision in a Form 8-K filed with the SEC.
48 See 2005 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 45, at 10. However, unlike Pfizer,
some companies, such as Office Depot, require a director to tender her resignation only
after she receives a withheld vote from a majority of the outstanding shares, as opposed
to a majority of the shares cast. See, e.g., OFFICE DEPOT, INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
GUIDELINES 2 (2005), available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/mediafiles/iro/94/94746
/corpgov/guidelines 9 26o05.pdf. This standard is much harder to achieve.
49 See MAJORITY ELECTIONS, supra note 43, at 3 (noting that ISS will examine
alternative structures to ensure that they represent an effective equivalent to majority
voting). In fact, ISS expressed concern that director resignation policies like Pfizer's
allow the board to make the final determination regarding the status of directors who fail
to receive a majority of the shareholders' support. See id. at 4. Illustrative of this concern,
factors boards can consider include length of service, director qualifications, and
2008]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
indicated that the "gold standard" was one providing for a majority vote
provision coupled with modification of the holdover rule.50 With regard to
other measures, the burden would be on the corporation to ensure that its
alternative framework allowed shareholders sufficient control over the
election process. 51 Then too, in January of 2006, Hewlett Packard Company
(HP) sought to exclude a shareholder proposal for majority voting on the
basis that its adoption of a plurality plus model represented substantial
compliance with shareholders' request. 52 The SEC's staff disagreed, and as a
result, maintained that HP could not exclude the proposal from its proxy
statement. 53 These responses reflected an apparent preference for a majority
vote default rule.
For the next few years, majority voting became the most high profile
issue of the proxy seasons.54 Indeed, shareholders submitted a record number
of proposals urging corporations to adopt majority vote standards. Thus, in
2005, shareholders submitted eighty-nine majority vote proposals.55 In 2006,
shareholders submitted virtually the same number of proposals during the
first six months of the proxy season.56 By the end of the 2006 season, more
than 150 proposals had been submitted calling for a majority vote default
rule, outnumbering all other proposals submitted.57 These numbers stand in
sharp contrast to the twelve majority vote proposals submitted during the
2004 proxy season.58 Moreover, these proposals garnered an increasingly
larger percentage of shareholder votes. In 2006, such proposals received an
contribution to the company. See Becky Yerak, Allstate Changes Election Rules:
Withheld Votes Can Pressure Directors, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 2, 2006, at 3.
50 See AJoRITY ELECTIONS, supra note 43, at 2.
51 See id. at 3.
52 See Hewlett Packard Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [2005-2006 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,137, at 77,233 (Jan. 5, 2006), 2006 WL 39271.
53 See id. at 77,247.
54 See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (revealing that the number of
shareholder proposals submitted related to majority voting outstripped all other proposals
submitted).
55 See Thaddeus Kopinski, Banner Year for Majority Elections, in RiSKMETRICS
GROUP INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2006 (on file with author).
56 Indeed, in the first half of 2006, shareholders submitted eighty-four majority vote
proposals. See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 16; Stephen Taub, Investors
Back Shareholder Resolutions, CFO.COM, Aug. 22, 2006, http://www.cfo.com/
article.cfm/7826000/c_7816474?f--TodayInFinanceInside. By contrast, fifty-four
proposals were submitted during the first half of 2005. See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT,
supra note 1, at 16.
57 See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 2, 16.
58 See Taub, supra note 56.
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average level of 48% support, up from 43% in 2005. 59 The number of
proposals that received more than 50% of the vote nearly tripled from
thirteen in 2005 to thirty-six in 2006.60 By comparison, such proposals only
garnered an average of 12% of shareholder votes in 2004, and during that
year, no proposal received majority shareholder support.61 Hence,
shareholder support for these proposals has increased dramatically over a
two-year period. 62
Although shareholder proposals were primarily non-binding,
corporations responded to them. A study by the Council of Institutional
Investors revealed that 63% of companies altered their voting mechanisms as
a result of strong shareholder support for change. 63 While Pfizer triggered
corporate adoption of plurality plus provisions, in January 2006, Intel Corp.
(Intel) led the way by changing its bylaws to provide a majority vote rule
coupled with a director resignation policy. 64 That same year, Dell, Inc.
59 See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 4, 16; Taub, supra note 56.
Majority vote proposals received an average level of support of 47.8% in the first half of
2006 and an average of 44.3% in the first half of 2005. See also 2005 PROXY SEASON
REPORT, supra note 45, at 8-9. Stories at individual companies underscore shareholders'
activism in this area. As an example, for the first time in its history, shareholders at
General Motors, Inc. rejected management's recommendation and voted in favor of a
majority vote proposal. See Jeremy W. Peters, In Switch, GM Shareholders Ask Board for
Stronger Say in Elections, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2006, at CI. At Textron, it had been more
than a decade since any shareholder proposal had received a favorable vote. But
shareholders approved the majority voting resolution by 59% of the vote. See Paul
Grimaldi, A Call for Change: Textron Shareholders Approve Proposal to Alter Voting,
PROVIDENCE J. (R.I.), Apr. 27, 2006, at F-01.
60 See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 16; see also Taub, supra note
56 (citing a 35% increase).
61 See Taub, supra note 56.
62 Interestingly, companies where proposals received the lowest levels of support
were those companies that had already implemented a plurality plus voting system or
some alternative voting mechanism. See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at
16; Kopinski, supra note 55. Hence, shareholder proposals received 19% of the vote at
General Electric Co. and 29% of the vote at Avon Products, Inc., both companies that had
already implemented a plurality plus voting regime. Id.
63 Brooke Masters, Proxy Measures Pushing Corporate Accountability Gain
Support, WASH. POST, June 17, 2006, at Al.
64 See Intel Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 19, 2006). Intel amended its
bylaws to change the standard of voting in uncontested director elections from plurality
to majority. Contested elections would remain as a plurality standard. In order to address
the holdover rule, directors who fail to receive a majority of votes cast must resign, and
then the board has ninety days to make a decision regarding whether to accept that
resignation. During that time, the director cannot participate in company actions.
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amended its charter to create a similar majority vote procedure. 65 By the end
of the proxy season, at least 180 corporations had altered their director
election policies.66 Most of these corporations have adopted some version of
a plurality plus standard. 67 However, at least forty companies have adopted
full-fledged majority voting provisions. 68 One study indicated that as of June
2006, about 145 Standard &Poor (S&P) 500 companies either require their
boards to be elected by majority vote or require directors to resign if a
majority of shareholders withhold their votes for a director.69 Fewer than
thirty companies had such provisions in place at the start of 2005.70 A more
recent study revealed that 52% of S&P 500 companies and 45% of Fortune
500 companies have adopted some form of majority voting or plurality plus
regime. 71 Given that only a handful of companies had a majority vote system
in place prior to 2005, the rate of change is striking.
This change is particularly noteworthy given the non-binding nature of
most shareholder resolutions. Indeed, while the trend seems to be in favor of
offering binding shareholder proposals, most proposals seeking to alter the
voting regime have been advisory.72 Previously, corporations appeared less
inclined to modify their policies as a result of these non-binding shareholder
proposals, even when they received a majority of the vote.73 Thus, while
63% of companies altered their voting rules as a result of shareholder
proposals in 2006, only 28% of companies did so in 2005.74 This suggests
that corporations' greater willingness to comply with shareholder resolutions
65 See ALLEN, supra note 39, at 59.
66 See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 2, 16.
67 See id. at 16 (noting that at least 140 companies had adopted a plurality plus
standard).
68 See id. at 2, 16.
69 Masters, supra note 63.
70 Id.
71 See ALLEN, supra note 39, at iii.
72 See id.
73 See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 854. According to Bebchuk's study, between 1997-
2003, 131 resolutions to abolish staggered boards received a majority of the votes cast by
shareholders, but by the end of 2004, corporations only had responded to a third of such
votes by declassifying their boards. But see Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 37, at 68
(explaining that a distinction must be made between corporations that ignore shareholder
resolutions and those that decline to take a recommended action after due consideration).
Brownstein and Kirman in fact insist that, at times, "ignoring" a resolution that receives a
majority of the vote is appropriate and consistent with directors' fiduciary obligations.
See id. at 77.
74 Masters, supra note 63.
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is a recent phenomenon. 75 In some cases, managers have even supported
majority vote proposals advanced by shareholders. 76 This reveals not only
that shareholders have increased their activism, but also that corporations
have increased their response.
Moreover, shareholders' quest for greater democracy has prompted a
response from legislatures. Hence, in August of 2005, Delaware amended its
corporate code in two respects. First, Delaware added a provision providing
that corporations can make irrevocable any resignation submitted as a result
of the failure to receive a required percentage of votes for reelection.77
Second, Delaware amended its statute to provide that directors cannot amend
or repeal any bylaw amendment adopted by shareholders that specifies the
votes necessary for election of directors.78 Both of these changes ensure that
if shareholders are successful in securing a majority vote standard, directors
cannot alter it. Similarly, the ABA modified the MBCA in order to make
resignations irrevocable when they result from the failure to receive a
specified number of votes. 79 In addition, the ABA provides for the adoption
of a plurality plus standard. Under the standard, directors who receive more
votes against them than for them in any election must tender their resignation
within ninety days or the date on which a replacement director is selected. 80
Neither the ABA nor Delaware adopted a majority vote standard, 81 but they
both offered an alternative measure designed to bolster shareholders' power
in director elections.
This albeit limited legislative response coupled with the corporate
response appears to have enhanced the momentum on the majority vote
movement. Thus far, the 2007 proxy season has witnessed 104 proposals
related to majority voting, by far the greatest number of proposals submitted
on a single issue. 82 Many practitioners appear to believe that majority voting
75 See Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 37, at 68-69 (noting that there has been a
"palpable shift" in the level of attention corporate actors pay to shareholder proposals).
76 Managers at Marriott International and Host Hotels supported shareholder
proposals calling for majority voting for directors. Both proposals received more than
95% of the vote, the largest level of shareholder support. See 2006 PROXY SEASON
REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
77 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 2006).
78 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (Supp. 2006).
79 MOD. Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.07 (2002).
80 MOD. Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.22 (2006).
81 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (Supp. 2006). Interestingly, California
amended its statute to allow corporations to adopt majority voting as the default rule,
which went into effect in January of 2007. See ALLEN, supra note 39, at iv.
82 Indeed, the next largest number of proposals was forty-five submitted for political
contributions, and forty-four requesting that corporations link pay to performance. See
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in some form will soon be the norm. Indeed, in a memo to its clients,
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz predicted that majority voting would
become "universal. '83 One official at International Shareholder Services
(ISS) indicated that most corporate governance experts believed that a
majority voting system was a "fait accompli. ' 84
2. Term Limits for Directors
Since the hostile takeover battles, shareholders have been pushing to
eliminate staggered boards. Staggered or classified boards refer to ones in
which only a portion of the directors stand for reelection every year. Hence,
each director on the board serves a multi-year term, generally three years.
Many corporations instituted staggered board terms in an effort to preserve
their discretion, but shareholders insist that such boards contribute to
managerial entrenchment, making it difficult to replace directors during a
proxy fight or hostile takeover battle. 85 As a result, shareholders have
continually pressured corporations to declassify their boards and move to a
system of annual elections. Thus, the average shareholder support for
proposals on this issue has increased steadily from 47% in 1997 to 62% in
2003.86 Beginning in 2000, such proposals have consistently averaged more
than 50% shareholder support.87 In 2004, the average support for
declassification proposals peaked at 71%.88
Support for this issue has remained high over the last two years, with one
commentator referring to board declassification as the "sleeper" issue of
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2007 PROXY SEASON WATCH LIST,
http://www.issproxy.com/ProxySeasonWatchlist/2007/index.jsp [hereinafter 2007
WATCH LIST].
83 William Baue, Majority- Vote Director Election Shareowner Resolutions to Top
100, Dominate Proxy Season, SOCIAL FUNDS, Jan. 10, 2006,
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/1902.html. In a memo to its clients, Latham
& Watkins, LLP advised its clients not to resist shareholder proposals requesting majority
vote structures, noting that the issue had left the proverbial station, and that there were
just no effective sound bites against shareholder demands for majority vote. See LATHAM
& WATKINS, LLP., MAJORITY VOTE FOR DIRECTORS: THE LATEST CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE 3 (2005), http://www.lw.com/upload/pubcontent/_pdf/
pub1437_ .pdf.
84 See Sara Hansard, With Patrick S. McGurn of Institutional Shareholder Services
Inc. (One on One), INVEST. NEWS, Sept. 18, 2006, at 42 (quoting Patrick McGurn, special
counsel, executive vice president, and director-corporate programs of ISS).
85 Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 853.
86 Id.
87 See id
88 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
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2006.89 While shareholders submitted a smaller number of proposals on
board declassification as compared to proposals on the more publicized
majority vote rule, declassification proposals averaged a higher level of
support. Thus, for the first half of 2005 and 2006, shareholders submitted 46
and 42 declassification proposals, respectively.90 By contrast, the number of
majority vote proposals submitted during the same period in 2006 was
double that amount. 91 However, in 2005, the average shareholder support for
declassification proposals reached 60%, while in 2006 such support climbed
to almost 67%.92
Perhaps most significant, corporations appear more willing to alter their
board structure in response to shareholder calls for declassification. Bebchuk
found that at companies where shareholder support for declassification
proposals surpassed 50%, less than one-third had eliminated their staggered
boards as of 2003.93 Indeed, at many companies, shareholders had been
submitting proposals (and garnering more than 50% support for those
proposals) for several years in a row without any favorable response.94
However, more recent studies suggest that companies are beginning to
eliminate their classified boards when shareholder support for such
elimination is strong. As a result, by the end of 2006, shareholders will elect
a majority of directors at S&P 500 annually. 95 While shareholder activism in
this area is not new, such corporate responsiveness is new. In this respect, it
is consistent with the broader trend towards increased shareholder
democracy.
89 Barry B. Burr, Majority Vote Issue Draws the Most Proxies; But Declassifying
Boards has Become 2006's 'Sleeper' Issue, PENSION AND INVEST., Apr. 3, 2006, at 3
(quoting a managing director of a Virginia-based proxy advisory company).
90 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-4.
91 See id. Eighty-four majority vote proposals were submitted during the first half of
2006.
92 Id. at 4 (noting that in 2005, the average support was 60.5%, while the average
support reached 66.8% in 2006).
93 See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 854.
94 See id. at 855; 2005 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 45, at 14 (explaining
multiple year proposals at companies like Maytag, where shareholders had submitted
such proposals for six consecutive years). Of note, shareholders withheld a record
number of votes from a board that had ignored their request for declassified boards for
five consecutive years, despite the majority support received by those requests. See 2004
PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 36, at 9 (explaining withheld vote against directors at
Federated Department Stores).
95 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 19; Masters, supra note 63.
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3. Shareholder Access to the Ballot
Another issue that has risen to prominence within the last few years is
shareholders' access to the corporation's proxy for purposes of nominating
their own candidates in director elections. Both shareholders and corporate
managers have the ability to nominate candidates to be voted on at the
corporation's annual election for directors. Rule 14a-8(i) allows the
corporation to exclude from its proxy statement any proposal that relates to
an election for membership to the board of directors. 96 This Rule means that
only management nominees can appear on the corporation's proxy statement;
shareholders are excluded from requiring the corporation to include the
names of their nominees on the corporation's ballot.
Under pressure to make directors and officers more accountable in the
wake of the governance scandals of 2002, the SEC proposed a new Rule 14a-
11 that would allow shareholders a limited right to include their nominees on
the corporation's proxy statement. 97 Under the proposed rule, shareholders
would be able to make use of the corporation's proxy materials when
nominating a director upon the occurrence of either of two triggering events.
One, shareholders must have withheld more than 35% of their votes from at
least one of the company's nominees for director.98 Alternatively, a
shareholder must have submitted a proposal requesting that the company
become subject to the direct access procedures under Rule 14a- 11, and the
board must have failed to implement the proposal within 120 days after such
proposal received more than 50% of the vote.99 Any shareholder who
submits a direct access proposal under the second triggering event must have
held at least 1% of the company's outstanding shares for one year.100 After
either of these two triggering events, Rule 14a-1 1 required a corporation to
place a shareholder nominee on its proxy statement in its next election for
directors, so long as the shareholder putting forth the nominee has held more
than 5% of the corporation's outstanding shares for at least two years.' 0 ' The
proposed rule also required that nominees satisfy certain eligibility
96 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2006). For a discussion of other substantive
exclusions, see Palmiter, supra note 28, at 890-92.
97 See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct.
23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274) [hereinafter Proposed Rule on
Nominations] (noting that the adoption of the new rule stemmed from concern over
"corporate scandals and the accountability of corporate directors").
9 8 See id. at 60,789.
99 See id at 60,789-90.
'
00 See id. at 60,789.
101 See id. at 60,794.
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requirements. 102 Finally, Rule 14a-1 1 modified Rule 14a-8(i) so that request
for compliance with the Rule would not be excludable under the provision
allowing corporations to exclude proposals that relate to the election of
directors.103
As crafted, the proposed rule was designed to afford long-term
shareholders access to the corporation's proxy statement when the board
appeared to be unresponsive to shareholder concerns. Indeed, the SEC and
shareholders pointed out that excluding shareholder nominees from the
corporation's proxy statement produced inequities because the exclusion
allowed the corporation to bear the costs associated with the election of
management candidates, while shareholders had to bear their own costs. 10 4 In
their view, these inequities ultimately limited the extent to which
shareholders could meaningfully put forth alternative candidates for director
elections, thereby diminishing their influence of, and oversight over,
corporate directors.10 5 According to Bebchuk, the costs associated with filing
a proxy statement and garnering investor support for director candidates can
be prohibitive, making the shareholder power to nominate directors "largely
inconsequential."' 106 Illustrative of this point, Bebchuk found that during
1996-2002, there was only an average of eleven instances per year where
director-nominated candidates faced competition from shareholder-
nominated candidates. 10 7 In proposing the new rule, the SEC indicated that
allowing access to the ballot would strengthen shareholder power by
providing shareholders with the meaningful ability to wage election contest,
enabling shareholders to impact election outcomes and hence corporate
governance affairs more generally. 108
However, intense opposition to the rule led to it being tabled and
ultimately abandoned. 10 9 In fact, after the rule proposal, several shareholders
102 See id. at 60,795-96. For example, the nomination must be consistent with
applicable state and federal laws, and the nominees must not have certain prohibited
relationships with the company or the nominating shareholder.
103 See Proposed Rule on Nominations, supra note 97, at 60,789 n.74.
104 See Battling for Corporate America, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, at 69, 70
(noting cost associated with shareholder nomination of directors).
105 See Proposed Rule on Nominations, supra note 97, at 60,784 (noting
shareholders' mounting frustration with their perceived inability to influence director
nomination process).
106 Brief of Harvard Law Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 3,
AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 05 Civ. 2390(LLS)).
107 See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 856.
108 See Proposed Rule on Nominations, supra note 97, at 60,784.
10 9 See DAVID A. KATZ & LAURA A. MCINTOSH, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE UPDATE:
PROXY ACCESs-NOT THEN, NOT Now 3 (2006), http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/
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submitted proposals requesting that their corporations amend their bylaws to
grant shareholders the ability to nominate directors consistent with Rule 14a-
11. Reflecting its commitment to the new Rule's modified stance on director
election proposals under Rule 14a-8(i), the SEC staff initially took the
position that such proposals could not be excluded from a corporation's
proxy statement.1 10 However, signaling the SEC's abandonment of the rule,
the SEC staff eventually changed course and reversed this stance. Thus, in
February 2005, the SEC's staff allowed Halliburton Company to exclude a
shareholder nomination proposal requesting that the company become
subject to Rule 14a-1 1. In its no-action letter, the SEC staff stated, "[g]iven
the passage of time... without [SEC] action... the position that the staff
intended to take ... is no longer necessary or appropriate.""'I  On the same
day, the SEC took a similar position with respect to Qwest Communications
International, Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. 112 In doing so, the SEC
staff underscored its intent to return to the status quo and prevent
shareholders from accessing the corporate ballot.
However, at the end of 2006, the Second Circuit breathed new life into
this issue. 113 In December of 2004, American Federation of State, County
pdfs/wlrk092806.pdf (noting that the complexities raised by the proposal led the SEC to
table its proposal indefinitely). The authors also note that the tabling of the proxy access
proposal spurred the increased insistence for majority voting.
110 For example, in 2004, Disney shareholders submitted a proposal requesting that
the company become subject to the nomination procedures set forth under Rule 14a- 11.
When Disney sought to exclude the proposal, the SEC indicated that its recent rule
proposal meant that Disney could not use Rule 14a-8(i) to exclude the shareholders'
request. See The Walt Disney Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 2848301, at *1 (Dec.
8, 2004).
111 Halliburton Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 283290, at *1 (Feb. 7, 2005).
The proposal requested that Halliburton become subject to the shareholder proposal rule
contemplated by SEC proposed rule 14a- 11. See id at *1-2.
112 See Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 283288, at *1
(Feb. 7, 2005); Verizon Commc'ns Inc., SEC No-Action letter, 2005 WL 283289, at *1
(Feb. 7, 2005).
113 Interestingly, shareholders also began bargaining for a nomination right in
connection with lawsuit settlements. Indeed, shareholders have managed to secure
nomination rights in settlements involving Ashland and Microtune. See, e.g., Corporate
Governance, Jan./Feb. 2005 News, http://www.corpgov.net/news/archives2005/ Jan-
Feb.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). In 2005, Ashland became the fourth company to
agree to allow shareholders to nominate directors in connection with a lawsuit settlement.
See id. (noting suits at Hanover Compression and Broadcom). Ashland has agreed to
solicit director candidates from its shareholders and nominate one candidate for election
to the board. Ashland also has agreed to limit the time served of its directors so that no
director serves for more than fifteen years and no director serves after the age of seventy.
In addition, the settlement requires that executive bonuses be tied to financial
performance and that two-thirds of its board would be independent directors. Similarly,
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and Municipal Employees, an employee pension plan (AFSCME), submitted
a proposal to be included on the proxy statement for the 2005 annual director
election for American International Group, Inc. (AIG). 114 The proposal
sought to amend AIG's bylaws to require that, under certain circumstances,
the company put the names of shareholder-nominated director candidates on
its proxy statement. 115 AIG requested that the SEC's staff issue a no-action
letter allowing it to exclude the proposal under Rule 14a-8(i) because it
related to an election. The SEC staff complied. 116 AFSCME appealed the
decision to federal district court in New York seeking to compel the
inclusion of their proposal. The district court denied the request. 117 However,
in AFSCME v. AIG, the Second Circuit reversed, disagreeing with the district
court and the SEC. Indeed, the SEC had taken the position that AFSCME's
proposed bylaw provision related to an election for directors and on that
basis could be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i). The Second Circuit concluded
that the statutory language regarding the exclusions was ambiguous and
could be interpreted as enabling corporations to exclude only those proposals
that relate to a particular election rather than those that focus on election
procedures.11 8 The Second Circuit also held that the SEC's interpretation did
not merit deference because its current interpretation of the rule was
inconsistent with prior SEC interpretations. 119 The Second Circuit concluded
its opinion by suggesting the need for the SEC to craft a more clear-cut
statement regarding shareholder access to corporations' proxy statements.
The SEC's response has been both slow and confusing. In January of
2007, the SEC's staff affirmatively declined to state a position on the
Microtune agreed to solicit nominees from its shareholders for the consideration of its
nominating committee, and then to provide for the election of two shareholder-nominated
candidates. Like Ashland, Microtune also agreed to a fifteen-year service limit for its
directors, and that two-thirds of such directors would be independent.
114 See AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2006).
115 See id at 124. The proposal provided, among other conditions, that the company
include the names of candidates put forth by investors who have owned at least 3% of the
outstanding common shares of AIG for at least a year. See id. at 124 n.3.
116 See American Int'l Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 372266 (Feb.
14, 2005).
117 See AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). After that
denial, shareholders again sought the SEC to allow its submission on the corporation's
proxy statement. However, the SEC confirmed its prior position, allowing the omission
of the proposal. See American Int'l Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL
721899, at *1 (Mar. 20, 2006).
118 SeeAFSCME, 462 F.3d at 125-26.
119 See id. at 126-29.
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issue. 120 Indeed, shareholders of HP had submitted a proposal that would
amend HP's bylaws to require that HP include shareholder nominees for
director under certain circumstances. 121 HP requested a no-action letter on its
decision to exclude the proposal. HP argued that, as a California corporation,
it was governed by the Ninth Circuit and hence not bound by the Second
Circuit's opinion. 122 As a result, HP contended that it should be free to
exclude such a proposal consistent with the positions articulated in the
Halliburton, Verizon, and Qwest no-action letters. The SEC's staff, however,
decided that it would express no view on the merits of HP's exclusion.1 23
The SEC Commissioner commended the staff's decision (or non-
decision), indicating that the entire Commission should settle the matter. 124
Yet it appears that the members of the Commission disagreed regarding the
manner in which proxy access should be settled. 125 As a result, the SEC
removed shareholder access to the proxy from its January 2007 list of
discussion items, signaling further delay in a definitive position on this
issue.126 Given the unsettled nature of this issue, the SEC's decision not to
decide left HP with considerable uncertainty regarding the viability of its
position. That uncertainty apparently prompted HP to include the proposal on
its proxy statement. 127
Interestingly, the proposal received about 43% of the shareholder
support, and both sides declared victory.12 8 Indeed, opponents noted that the
vote fell far short of the two-thirds necessary for it to pass. Proponents
120 See Hewlett-Packard Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 224970, at *1 (Jan.
22, 2007) (noting that the SEC's staff expresses no view on whether HP can exclude the
proposal).
121 Under the proposal, HP would be required to include in its proxy statement any
person nominated by a stockholder holding at least 3% or more of HP stock for at least
two years. See id. at *2.
122 See id. at *1.
123 See id.
124 See Carrie Johnson, SEC Delays Decision on Board Nominations, WASH. POST,
Jan. 23, 2007, at D02.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See id Tomoeh Murakami Tse, HP Investors Reject "Proxy Access" Proposal:
Would Have Opened Up Board-Nominating Process, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2007, at D02
(revealing that the HP proposal was included on the proxy statement, but did not receive
majority approval).
128 See Tse, supra note 127. Some news outlets reported that the proposal received
36% of the vote, but the figure apparently included abstentions. See Posting of Ted Allen
to Risk & Governance Blog, http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2007/03/proxyaccessgets_43
at hpsubm.html (Mar. 16, 2007).
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argued that the vote represented strong support for the measure, particularly
because it represented a first-time vote and most shareholder proposals tend
to receive a low level of support during their first vote. Moreover, proponents
maintain that such a strong level of shareholder support not only should
encourage other shareholders to support similar efforts, but also should
prompt the SEC to revitalize its attempts to allow shareholder access to the
corporation's proxy.
As of the date of this Article, the SEC has finally spoken on the issue of
proxy access, but with a divided voice. In July of 2007, SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox requested public comment on two conflicting proxy access
proposals.129 Thus, Cox voted with two commissioners in favor of a proposal
that would allow shareholders holding 5% or more of a company's shares to
propose bylaw amendments that establish procedures for enabling
shareholder nominees to be included in a company's proxy statement. 130
However, Cox also voted with two other commissioners to forbid
shareholders from putting forth proposals related to board elections or
nominations. 131 As a result Cox has enabled the public to comment on the
merits of two conflicting proposals, one that would grant access and the other
that would restrict access and confirm the status quo. 132 Such a result reveals
the sharp divisions in the SEC, while making it unclear how the SEC
ultimately will settle the question of proxy access. What is clear, however, is
that Cox likely will be the swing vote on any proxy access decision. And Cox
has promised a clear rule in time for the next proxy season. 133
While shareholders have experienced less success on this issue, there
continue to be increased levels of activism around it. To date, the status of
shareholder access to the corporation's proxy remains unclear. However, this
lack of clarity appears to be keeping the issue alive. As a result, shareholder
129 See Carrie Johnson, SEC Proposal Raises Profile of Investors: Divided Panel
Tackles Issues of Pay, Board Membership, WASH. POST, July 26, 2007, at DO1; Stephen
Labaton, A Public Airing for Proposals on Shareholders, NY TIMES, July 26, 2007, at
C3.
130 See Shareholder Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. 43466 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
131 See id. at 43,488-96 (shareholder proposals relating to the election of directors).
132 And in fact, as this Article was going to press, the SEC did make a decision with
regard to proxy access, deciding to reject such access. See infra note 133.
133 As this Article was in the process of going to press, the SEC decided to embrace
the proposal that would prevent shareholders from placing their director candidates on the
proxy statement. See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed.
Reg. 70,450 (proposed Dec. 11, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). However,
Cox has indicated a desire to reopen the issue. See Karey Wutkowski, SEC to Look
Outside Ballot on Proxy Access, REUTERS, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSN 1741224720080104.
2008]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
activists predict that the 2007 proxy season will see renewed activity on this
issue. 134
When viewed together, it appears that shareholders' recent activism has
been successful. Most notably, the increased shareholder support for a
majority vote regime and the elimination of staggered boards has caused
many corporations to alter their governance structures. While shareholders'
ability to obtain access to the proxy remains an open issue, shareholders have
at least caused the SEC to reconsider the issue. More importantly, activism
on these issues has not occurred in a vacuum. Instead, shareholders have seen
success on a host of other issues that aim to enhance their power, while
developments at the SEC and other agencies also seem to increase
shareholder democracy. 135 Thus, one expert refers to the combination of
developments regarding shareholders' voting rights as the proverbial "perfect
storm" that should serve to shift corporate power into the hands of
shareholders. 136
To be sure, it is not clear that shareholders will sustain their levels of
activism or that their activism will produce its desired result. Indeed, some of
the shareholders who have been active of late are relatively new to activism
and thus may not sustain their activity in the long run. In fact, as Bainbridge
suggests, shareholders' natural and rational apathy may undercut the extent
to which they will use the power granted to them.137 Moreover, it is not clear
that increasing shareholder power will lead to better accountability or
otherwise rectify corporate governance failures. In other contexts, scholars
have pointed out that shareholder activism through the shareholder proposal
process represents an ineffective mechanism for altering corporate practices,
particularly practices involving executive compensation schemes. 138 Other
studies confirm the notion that shareholder activism has minimal impact on
corporate performance. 139 Thus it is not clear, and this Article does not
contend, that increasing shareholder power will prove effective. However, if
such power is augmented, this Article seeks to ascertain whether it will be
detrimental to the interests of other constituents.
134 See Tse, supra note 127.
135 See ALLEN, supra note 39, at v (pinpointing various developments).
136 Id.
137 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 5, at 1753.
138 See Marino, supra note 35, at 1236-37, 1246 (noting that executive
compensation levels continue to increase notwithstanding shareholders' increased ability
to submit proposals related to such compensation).
139 Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 182 (2001).
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II. ALLIES OR ADVERSARIES: IS INCREASING SHAREHOLDER
POWER A ZERO SuM GAME?
Calls for increasing shareholder power have sparked intense debate
among academics, practitioners, legislators, and judges. One of the most
prominent supporters of increasing shareholder power has been Professor
Lucian Bebchuk. In his article, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,
Bebchuk not only outlined a system for increasing shareholder power, but
also set forth a normative rationale for the appropriateness of that increase.
140
His proposal would move beyond strengthening shareholders' existing rights
and allow shareholders to initiate changes to the corporation's basic
governance structures, as well as intervene in certain fundamental
decisions. 141 Bebchuk maintains that increasing shareholder democracy in
these ways will enhance managerial accountability and thereby improve
corporate performance and firm value. 142
In comparison, Professor Stephen Bainbridge has argued that proposals
calling for increasing shareholder power would undermine one of the key
virtues of the American corporation and therefore have a negative impact on
corporate value. 143 In Bainbridge's view, the separation of ownership and
control represents a valuable feature of American corporations. 14 4 Operating
a large business entails managing the concerns of various constituents with
divergent interests and access to information. The most cost-effective and
efficient method of managing such an enterprise is for shareholders and other
corporate constituents to delegate their authority to some centralized body. 14
5
In other words, the public corporation demands that some central body be
vested with the power and discretion to make decisions on behalf of the
entire firm. 146 The board represents that body and thus is best positioned to
140 See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 833.
141 See id. at 837-47 (outlining rationales for allowing shareholders to make "rules
of the game" decisions such as those involving charter amendments and reincorporation,
as well as reasons for allowing shareholders to intervene in certain "game-ending"
decisions such as those involving mergers and dissolution).
142 See id. at 842-43. In fact, Bebchuk maintains that he is not interested in
increasing shareholder power for its intrinsic value. Rather, he supports such increase
only to the extent that it advances shareholder value.
143 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 5, at 1749.
144 See id. at 1749, 1751; Bainbridge, Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 5, at
636.
145 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 5, at 1746; Bainbridge,
Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 5, at 624.
146 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 5, at 1746; Bainbridge,
Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 5, at 624.
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make the most effective and efficient decisions. 147 As a result, shifting power
away from directors and into the hands of shareholders is not only
inappropriate, but also inefficient. Given the success of American businesses
throughout the year, we should be extremely reluctant to alter the status
quo. 148 Others argue that the diverse nature of shareholders means that they
do not share a common interest, and hence shifting power to them would
encourage rent seeking and reduce shareholder value. 149 This Article's
purpose is not to focus on the merits of shareholder power, but rather to
assess the impact of that power on other constituents.
In fact, Bebchuk notes that one very important critique of his proposal is
that it may have negative repercussions for stakeholders. 150 According to this
critique, increasing shareholder power may undermine corporate officers and
directors' ability to attend to the interests of other stakeholders. In fact,
Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have suggested that the corporate
board serves as a mediator of various interests within the corporation. 151
Consistent with such a role, corporate power should remain in the hands of
managers because they are best able to balance the interests of all corporate
shareholders, and shifting power into the hands of shareholders will undercut
directors' ability and willingness to pay heed to other corporate
constituents. 152
147 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 5, at 1746; Bainbridge,
Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 5, at 624.
148 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 5, at 1739; Bainbridge,
Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 5, at 626.
149 See Anabtawi, supra note 18, at 575. In fact, both Bainbridge and Chancellor
Strine question whether shareholders will act in the best interests of the firm or will
advance their own narrow self-interests. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 5,
at 1754; Strine, supra note 14, at 1771.
150 See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 912.
151 See Blair & Stout, supra note 7, at 253-54, 286 (describing board's function as a
mediating hierarchy); see also John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate
Cooperation, Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate
Law, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1443, 1446 (1994) (noting that the board is in the best position to
mediate between the concerns of shareholders and other constituents within the firm).
152 See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 908; Blair & Stout, supra note 7, at 304-05; Lynn
A. Stout & Iman Anabtawi, Sometimes Democracy Isn't Desirable, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10,
2004 (noting that boards mediate conflicts among shareholders and other corporate
constituents and ensure that corporate policy "will not be set by an anonymous, myopic,
return-hungry pack of shareholders"). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 593-605 (2003)
(advancing arguments against the conception of the board as a mediator); David Millon,
New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of
Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1001, 1024-42 (2000) (noting that corporate law does
not reflect the idea of the board as a mediator).
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Bebchuk maintains that such a critique is important because of its
potential to shift the debate away from one that pits shareholders against
managers to one that pits shareholders against other corporate interests
within the corporate arena. 153 Indeed, Bebchuk notes that these kinds of
arguments played a critical role in the takeover debates, lending legitimacy to
managerial efforts to retain their broad discretion in the face of shareholder
efforts to exert greater influence over corporate takeover decisions.' 54
Indeed, it was in the context of the takeovers that the Delaware courts
acknowledged for the first time the directors' ability to pay heed to other
constituents and even to advance the interests of those constituents over
shareholders' financial concerns. 155 Moreover, takeover battles spurred the
adoption of so-called "other constituency" or "stakeholder" statutes granting
directors the express power to consider non-shareholder interests when
carrying out their fiduciary responsibilities, and even subordinate shareholder
concerns to those interests. 156 Hence, the notion that limited shareholder
power is necessary to ensure adequate attention to stakeholder concerns
played a key role in legitimizing managerial discretion, and therefore tipping
the balance of power away from shareholders and towards managers.
Injecting stakeholders into the debate regarding shareholder democracy
similarly threatens to bolster the importance of managerial authority, thereby
diminishing the legitimacy of shareholder democracy.
Bebchuk responds to this stakeholder-based critique principally by
advancing reasons why managers' interests are not aligned with those of
stakeholders. Of course, Bebchuk notes that there are some decisions,
153 See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 912 (noting the power of the argument and its
ability to boost the legitimacy of claims against shareholder power).
154 See id. at 908.
155 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting
that a court may consider the impact of a takeover "on 'constituencies' other than
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally)"); see also Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150
(Del. 1989) (allowing shareholders to consider non-financial interests, and noting that a
board is not under any "per se duty to maximize shareholder value").
156 See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope
of Directors' Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder
Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409, 460-61 (2002) (noting that thirty-two states
had enacted some form of constituency statute granting directors the ability to consider a
broad array of stakeholder interests such as employees, suppliers, customers, and the
local or national community); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 610
(1992); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 26-27 (1992).
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particularly "game-ending" decisions like those involving a takeover, 157 that
may benefit shareholders and yet have adverse ramifications for
stakeholders. 158 Hence, there may be occasions where stakeholder and
shareholder interests diverge. However, Bebchuk insists that such divergence
does not support a regime of limited shareholder power. This is because there
is no reason to expect that mangers will effectively protect shareholders'
interests. 159 In fact, Bebchuk argues that managers' interests do not intersect
with those of shareholders except in very limited ways. 160 Because of this,
directors are more likely to use their discretion to advance their own self-
interests. 161 In Bebchuk's view, because managers do not make effective
agents for stakeholders, stakeholders should not be used to justify limits on
shareholder power.
However, this Article seeks to respond to the argument in a different
manner. Thus, the remainder of Part II seeks to determine whether
shareholders can serve as allies for other corporate constituents in a manner
that ensures that increased shareholder power will also increase the level of
attention provided to other corporate interests.
A. Multiplicity within Shareholder Ranks
As an initial matter, the notion that shareholder interests are at odds with
those of stakeholders appears to be based on a very narrow and one-
dimensional conception of shareholders. Instead, as several scholars have
recently pointed out, there are a variety of different shareholders with
different sets of concerns. 162 Many of these concerns align with stakeholder
concerns.
157 Game-ending decisions encompass decisions to merge, sell all the corporate
assets, or dissolve. See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 837.
15 8 See id at 909.
159 Seeid. at 911.
160 See id.
161 Seeid at 912.
162 See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 18, at 564 (noting the various and conflicting
interests among shareholders); K.A.D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30 J.
CoRP. L. 219, 229-42 (2005) (discussing different investors and their divergent
concerns); Lynn Stout, Shareholders Should Not Always Come First, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
28, 2005, at 15 [hereinafter Stout, Shareholders Not Always First] (noting that many
suffer from the mistaken assumption that shareholders in public companies have a single
shared interest).
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Indeed, one way in which shareholders' interests diverge is in their time
horizons. Some shareholders are short-term investors, while others expect to
hold their investments for a longer period of time. 163
Under this dichotomy, there are many shareholders with short-term
horizons whose interests appear narrowly focused on financial return. Both
mutual funds and hedge funds appear to be driven by the promise of short-
term financial gain without regard to the interests of other constituents. 164
Moreover, mutual funds and hedge funds have increasingly larger stakes in
the public market, and hence may be responsible for the increased focus on
short-term profits. 165  These short-term investors appear to be the
paradigmatic investors whose interests conflict with stakeholders. Hence,
such shareholders legitimize the contention that increased shareholder power
will be detrimental to the interests of stakeholders.
However, there are some investors with long-term horizons whose
interests do align with those of stakeholders. These long-term investors,
including institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension
funds, have an interest in supporting policies that benefit stakeholders. 166
Such shareholders recognize that the corporation must pay heed to the
interests of stakeholders in order to promote the long-term health of the
corporation. As a result, such investors are willing to forego short-term
financial gain. 167
Then too, many scholars have pinpointed the different interests
animating diversified and undiversified shareholders. Undiversified
shareholders have their investment tied up in one company, while diversified
163 See Anabtawi, supra note 18, at 579 (explaining conflicting objectives of
shareholders with different investment horizons); Matheson & Olson, supra note 151, at
1487 (noting long-term objectives of shareholders).
164 See Anabtawi, supra note 18, at 580 (noting that mutual funds and hedge funds
have short time horizons that pressure them to focus on short term profits gains); Camara,
supra note 162, at 239. But see Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in
Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1431, 1445 (2006) (noting that "even
the most narrowly focused shareholders" are concerned about other constituents because
by advancing the concerns of such constituents, the corporation can avoid litigation and
other costs associated with inflicting social harms).
165 See Anabtawi, supra note 18, at 579.
166 See Anabtawi, supra note 18, at 579-80; Matheson & Olson, supra note 151, at
1487 (noting that long-term shareholders understand that a corporation's sustained
growth depends on focusing on other stakeholders); Ribstein, supra note 164, at 1459
("A firm's long-run profits may depend significantly on satisfying the social demands of
consumers, employees and local communities.").
167 See Anabtawi, supra note 18, at 579.
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shareholders own stock in a wide variety of corporations. 168 Diversified and
undiversified shareholders differ in their concerns regarding externalities-
that is, the impact of a given policy on the rest of the market. 169
Undiversified shareholders may only be concerned about the manner in
which a given policy will impact their specific corporation. 170 Diversified
shareholders worry about the impact of a specific corporation's policies on
the broader society and market because those policies affect the value of the
portfolio of shares such investors hold. Diversified shareholders are more
likely to care when companies engage in activities that prove detrimental to
the broader community. 171 Given the large number of diversified
shareholders, this insight suggests that there are many investors who are
likely to be concerned about the manner in which a corporation's policies
impact the broader pool of stakeholders.
More specifically, of course, there exist shareholders who invest with an
eye towards advancing social concerns. These so-called "social investors"
include faith-based organizations, pension funds, and socially responsible
investor funds. 172 Such shareholders clearly have an interest in issues beyond
16 8 See JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY
CAPITALISM 21 (2000) (referring to the notion that many shareholders are "universal"
investors who "own the economy" as opposed to a specific corporation's assets);
Anabtawi, supra note 18, at 583-85; Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and
Bagholders (or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 BUS. LAW. 429,
434-35 (1998); Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are
Learning Martin Lipton May be Right, 60 Bus. LAW. 1435, 1447-48 (2005) [hereinafter
Stout, Ivory Tower] (noting the interests of universal shareholders differ from those of
undiversified shareholders).
169 See Anabtawi, supra note 18, at 579.
170 Interestingly, this does not mean that undiversified shareholders are unconcerned
with stakeholders. Instead, undiversified shareholders tend to have large stakes in a given
company. This increases the likelihood that they are long-term investors. Hence, it is
likely that such shareholders care deeply about their own firm's employees, customers,
and creditors because their investment is linked with the well-being of these other
stakeholder groups. In this regard, it is probably more accurate to state that diversified
shareholders are concerned about a broader range of stakeholders.
171 See Anabtawi, supra note 18, at 584-85; Booth, supra note 168, at 434 (noting
diversified investors' concern for other stakeholders); Stout, Shareholders Not Always
First, supra note 162 (noting conflicting interests between diversified and undiversified
shareholders).
172 See Stout, Ivory Tower, supra note 168, at 1449 (discussing the social
shareholder). While social activism is generally confined to particular investors within
the U.S., in other countries there appears to be a broader level of shareholder support for
such issues. In fact, mainstream investors in the United Kingdom have led the way in
pressuring corporations to provide more robust social responsibility disclosures. See
Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is there an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to
Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. GIN. L. REv. 75, 95-96, 97-98 (2005).
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financial matters. The main purpose of socially responsible investment funds
is to invest in ways that focus companies' attention on the impact of their
actions on stakeholders.' 73 Similarly, faith-based organizations often invest
in companies in order to advance particular stakeholder-based concerns. 174
Then too, union and public pension funds tend to focus on concerns beyond
short-term profits.175
In fact, some shareholders are also stakeholders. The most obvious
example of this phenomenon is union pension funds because such funds are
comprised of employees and hence presumably seek to advance the interests
of employees. 176 A less obvious example is the notion that shareholders also
may be both consumers and members of a particular community. 177 This
overlap of roles increases the likelihood that shareholders will support the
corporate consideration of issues that extend beyond profit.178
The existence of these and other shareholders whose interests align with
stakeholders undermines the contention that investors as a class will object to
the advancement of stakeholder concerns or otherwise use their increased
power to undercut the interests of stakeholders.
173 See George Djurasovic, The Regulation of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds,
22 J. CORP. L. 257, 260-61 (1997); Adam K. Kanzer, Proxy Voting Guidelines and
Procedures-Proxy Season 2004, SL046 ALI-ABA 1, 7 (2005); Michael S. Knoll,
Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets: The Conflicting Claims Underlying
Socially Responsible Investment, 57 Bus. LAW. 681, 687-89 (2002); Maria O'Brien
Hylton, "Socially Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an
Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 7 (1992).
174 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 178 (noting that religious organizations
were the innovators of every social issues topic later supported by pension funds). The
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility was founded in 1971, a group of some 275
faith-based investors whose principal objective is to advance issues of social
responsibility. See Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Values and Corporate Decision Making:
An Interdisciplinary Interfaith Conference for Corporate Executives and Legal Counsel:
Foreword, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 537, 541 (2006); see also Interfaith Center on
Corporate Responsibility, About ICCR, http://www.iccr.org/about (last visited Feb. 8,
2008).
175 See Anabtawi, supra note 18, at 588-89; Camara, supra note 162, at 235;
Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered,
93 COLUM. L. REv. 795, 803 (1993).
176 However, it is also possible that certain pension funds will focus on issues that
are not in the best interests of employees. See Romano, supra note 175, at 811-14
(discussing the political pressure that often motivates the advocacy of public pension
funds).
177 See Ribstein, supra note 164, at 1444.
178 See id
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B. Shareholders as Advocates
The empirical evidence reveals that shareholders play an affirmative role
in advancing the interests of stakeholders through the shareholder proposal
process. Initially, the proxy rules prohibited shareholders from submitting
proposals related to social issues. 179 However, in 1976, the SEC removed this
social cause exclusion. 180 When this occurred, several groups emerged that
began to use the proposal process to advance stakeholder-oriented issues.
Since that time, shareholders have filed numerous proposals every year
aimed at addressing stakeholder issues, from requesting sustainability reports
to pushing for better employee benefits and environmental policies. 181 The
Episcopal Church led the way as the first faith-based institution to file a
proposal as a shareholder to focus attention on a social issue, in that case
179See Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 4775, 17 Fed. Reg.
11,431 (Dec. 11, 1952) (allowing management to exclude proposals submitted "primarily
for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or
similar causes."); see also Myron P. Curzan & Mark L. Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate
Democracy: Control of Investment Managers' Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy
Issues, 93 HARV. L. REv. 670, 676 (1980) (noting SEC's view that matters related to
political or social issues were not proper subjects for inclusion in the corporation's proxy
materials); Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder
Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights
Accountability, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 365, 376-77 (2006); Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to
Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1129, 1152-53 (1993).
180 In 1970, the D.C. Circuit asked the SEC to revisit the social cause exclusion. In
Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, shareholders submitted a proposal to Dow
Chemical Co. requesting the corporation to cease using and manufacturing napalm. Med.
Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot,
404 U.S. 403 (1972). When Dow Chemical chose to exclude the proposal, the SEC issued
a no-action letter supporting the exclusion. However, in reviewing the decision, the D.C.
Circuit indicated that such exclusions were not consistent with the legislative purpose of
Section 14(a). See id. at 681-82. The court noted that shareholders had a legitimate
interest in ensuring that a company's resources be used in a socially responsible manner.
See id. at 681. This case prompted the SEC to reverse its position and allow shareholders
to submit proposals that advanced social causes. See Adoption of Amendments Relating
to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg.
52,994, 52,998 (Nov. 22, 1976); see also Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 179, at 676-77;
Fisch, supra note 179, at 1154-55.
The SEC replaced the social cause exclusion with a general exclusion for matters
relating to the ordinary conduct of a corporation's business. See id. The SEC applied a
case-by-case approach to determine if shareholder proposals sufficiently transcended
issues related to ordinary business to be deemed valid. See Dhir, supra note 179, at 379-
82; Palmiter, supra note 28, at 892. The results of this application often produced
inconsistent results. See Dhir, supra note 179, at 380-82.
181 See 2005 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 45, at 41; Dhir, supra note 179, at
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divestment from South Africa. 182 In fact, a recent study reveals that faith-
based organizations are generally the first investors to submit proposals on a
particular social issue. 183 Following such groups, public pension funds have
been among the most active social investors, filing numerous proposals
related to stakeholder concerns.18 4 Socially responsible investment funds also
use the proposal process to generate dialogue with companies on a variety of
stakeholder issues.185 For example, from 1994-2005, the Domini Funds filed
over 100 shareholder resolutions at more than fifty corporations on a variety
of social and environmental issues.18 6 This data reveals that shareholders do
use their voting power to advance stakeholder-oriented issues.
Moreover, these social proposals get the support of other investors. To be
sure, social proposals have never received the kind of shareholder support
that corporate governance proposals receive.18 7 However, many of these
proposals have garnered a significant percentage of the shareholder vote. 188
For example, in 1997, a request that Disney link its executive compensation
to social and environmental performance garnered 10% of the shareholder
vote, while a request that Household International, Inc. link its executive pay
to predatory lending performance garnered an impressive 27% of the
shareholder vote.189 In 1999, a request that R.R. Donnelly issue a study on
pay equity garnered sixteen percent shareholder support. 190 This support
reveals that many shareholders are willing to use their voting rights to
support the interests of other stakeholders.
182 See Patricia Daly, Viable Models: Shareholder Resolutions, 11 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 619, 620 (2006). The proposal was filed against General Motors, Inc. See
id.
183 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 178. In fact, the study revealed that such
entities were the innovators of every topic that pension funds later came to support. See
id.
184 See Camara, supra note 162, at 235; Romano, supra note 175, at 814; see also
Schwab & Thomas, supra note 35, at 1043-47 (describing labor unions' use of
shareholder proposal process).
185 See Kanzer, supra note 173, at 7; Knoll, supra note 173, at 689. As will be
discussed in infra Part II.D, such funds tend to focus on issues of importance to particular
segments of the stakeholder population.
186 See Kanzer, supra note 173, at 9-15.
187 See 2004 PROxY SEASON REPORT, supra note 36, at 28 (noting that social
proposals have historically received relatively low levels of support, seldom in excess of
the 20% mark).
188 See id.
189 See Kanzer, supra note 173, at 9.
190 See id.
2008]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
This support is critical to gain the attention of management. Indeed,
while social investors often pave the way for consideration of stakeholder
issues by submitting relevant proposals, 191 they do not comprise a large
component of the total shareholder class. Thus, social investors need the
support of other investors in order for their proposals to garner a significant
percentage of the shareholder vote. By highlighting the support social
proposals receive from other investors, the proxy data suggests that
traditional shareholders can be counted on to use their increased power to
support social investors who advance stakeholder issues.
Perhaps most importantly, shareholder activism on these issues has
increased along with the activism related to corporate governance issues.
Thus, over the last few years, shareholders have submitted an increasingly
greater number of proposals associated with stakeholders. 192 In fact, in 2006,
the number of social proposals outnumbered the number of proposals
submitted on every corporate governance issue other than majority vote and
pay-for-performance proposals. 193 Then too, there has been a steady increase
in the level of shareholder support for these issues. 194 Thus, the percentage of
proposals receiving a significant level of support nearly doubled from 2005
to 2006.195 Then too, the average shareholder support for social proposals
went from 18% in 2005 to close to 27% in 2006.196 In fact, in the past few
years, many stakeholder-oriented proposals have received a record level of
191 2005 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 45, at 41 (noting that faith-based
organizations and labor and union pension funds submit most of the social proposals);
Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 166 (same).
192 The number of proposals filed on these issues has steadily increased from 268 in
2002 to 329 in 2006. 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 31; 2004 PROXY
SEASON REPORT, supra note 36, at 28 (noting a twenty percent increase in the number of
socially oriented proposals filed from 2003 to 2004). As of the end of January 2007, 87
proposals have been submitted on social responsibility issues. See 2007 WATCH LIST,
supra note 82. This includes 35 on reports related to sustainability, 7 related to reports on
energy efficiencies, and 45 on political contributions.
193 See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 30-34.
194 Beginning in 2003, shareholder proposals began receiving unusually high levels
of support. See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER & INTERFAITH CENTER ON
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, 2003 SHAREHOLDER PROXY SEASON OVERVIEW: SOCIAL
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RESOLUTION TRENDS 2 (2003) (on file with author)
[hereinafter SOCIAL TRENDS]; see also Bradley S. Austin & C. Keith Taylor, Empirical
Study: Recent Trends Surrounding the Responsiveness of Corporate Boards of Directors
to Shareholder Proposals (15 WAKE FOREST L. REV., Working Paper No. 2, 2005)
(revealing a steady increase in the success rate of social proposals).
195 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 30. Twenty-seven percent of such
proposals received more than 15% support from shareholders. In 2004 and 2005, only
15% of such proposals achieved this level of support. Id.
196 See id.
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support. Thus, in 2004, a request that the Coca-Cola Co. generate a report on
the operational impact of HIV/AIDS garnered close to 98% of the
shareholder vote. 197 Proposals calling for corporations to issue sustainability
reports garnered as much as 42% of the shareholder vote. 198 In this same
vein, shareholder support for proposals concerning greenhouse gas emissions
or climate control reached a new high in 2006, garnering almost 40% of the
shareholder vote. 199 Employment-related proposals also saw record levels of
support in 2006, with several receiving as much as 35% of the shareholder
vote. 200 In addition, proposals requesting reports on global labor standards
fared well, with one receiving almost 50% of the shareholder vote.20 1 This
evidence reveals that shareholders' increased activism and power have not
had a negative impact on stakeholder issues. Instead, such concerns appear to
have benefited from increased shareholder activism.
Of note, proxy data suggest that social proposals are drawing increased
support from institutional and traditional investors as such shareholders have
begun to equate good corporate governance with a focus on particular
stakeholder concerns, including employees, consumers, and the larger
community. 20 2 Indeed, proxy analysts have noted an increased level of
collaboration between social investors and more traditional ones.203 This
collaboration has generated a greater level of shareholder support on such
197 2004 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 36, at 28-30. The proposal, which was
backed by management, received 97.93% of the votes cast.
198 Id. at 29. Request for sustainability reports received 20.34% of the vote at NVR
Inc., 30.40% of the vote at Cooper Cameron Corp., 32.92% of the vote at Yum! Brands
Inc., and 42.19% of the vote at The Ryland Group Inc.
199 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 30. Request for reports on energy
efficiency plans won 39.3% of the vote at Standard Pacific and 28.7% of the vote at Bed
Bath and Beyond. In a similar vein, reports focused on toxic emissions won 31.6% of the
vote at one company and 28.9% of the vote at another. Id. at 30-31.
200 Id at 33-34. For example, a resolution requesting corporations to amend their
non-discrimination policy to include sexual orientation received 34.6% of the shareholder
vote at Exxon Mobil and 33.6% of the vote at Expeditors International. Id. at 33.
201 Id. at 32 (discussing a proposal at Lear that received 49.8% of the shareholder
vote).
202 See Olubunmi Faleye & Emery Trahan, Is What's Best for Employees Best for
Shareholders? at 1, 24 (2006), http://ssm.com/abstract=-888180 (noting that the market
appears to value corporate concem for workers); Williams & Conley, supra note 172, at
78-79 (discussing trends that have altered society's expectations regarding business).
203 See 2005 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 45, at 41 (noting that the most
recent proxy seasons were characterized by increased collaboration between proponents
of social responsibility issues and other investors).
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issues.204 Moreover, this collaboration has blurred the lines between
governance and social issues: traditional investors have begun to view social
issues as important to shareholder value while social investors have become
increasingly concerned with traditional governance matters. 20 5 This suggests
that, far from creating adversaries, activism within shareholder ranks has
spurred alliances among shareholders. From this perspective, it is arguable
that increased shareholder power may increase the ability of social investors
to focus other shareholders' attention on stakeholder-oriented matters.
Then too, shareholders' advocacy on these issues has triggered responses
from corporate managers. Proxy analysts tend to measure the success of
social proposals in terms of management's willingness to engage
shareholders on pertinent issues, rather than the level of shareholder support
for such proposals. 206 By this measurement, shareholders have experienced
considerable success. In characterizing the corporate response to social
proposals over the last two years, proxy analysts contend that there has been
tremendous cooperation between shareholders and managers. Hence in 2005
and 2006, shareholders withdrew a record number of proposals. 20 7 This
withdrawal signals that corporate managers and shareholders have reached
consensus regarding the best method to address issues raised by a particular
proposal. 20 8 Thus, the data reflect an increased willingness on the part of
corporate leaders to engage on these issues.209 This suggests that there has
been a "spill-over effect." As managers feel greater pressure to negotiate
204 See Timothy Smith, Institutional and Social Investors Find Common Ground, 14
J. OF INVESTING (Fall 2005) (noting that social and environmental issues have been
integrated into concerns of institutional investors, leading such investors to support
proposals related to these issues); 2004 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 36, at 28
(noting that increased support for social proposals stems from the greater support from
other traditional investors who view such proposals as important for shareholder value).
205 SOCIAL TRENDS, supra note 194, at 1 (noting increased collaboration between
traditional shareholders and efforts by labor unions, religious investors, and socially
responsible investment companies, which have blurred the lines between social and
governance issues).
206 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 173.
207 See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 30. For example, a large
number of proposals submitted by Domini regarding expanding employment
discrimination policies to include sexual orientation were withdrawn after favorable
discussions with corporate management. See Kanzer, supra note 173, at 9.
208 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 174 (noting that a withdrawn proposal
tells an important story about the campaigns' success). Of course, a withdrawn proposal
may also signal that management has made some personal concession to the shareholder
group at issue. This problem will be addressed in Part III infra.
209 2004 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 36, at 28.
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with traditional shareholders on corporate governance issues, they also
experience pressure to be more cooperative on these social issues.2 10
C. Stakeholder Legitimacy and Shareholder Activism
A recent examination of shareholder activism related to social proposals
suggests that shareholders play a critical role in both prompting dialogue on
stakeholder issues and eventually legitimizing those issues so that corporate
managers and other shareholders take them seriously. Professors Trexler
Proffitt and Andrew Spicer examined shareholder proposals over a thirty-five
year period. 211 Based on their examination, Proffitt and Spicer likened
shareholder activism to a social movement and explained that shareholders
play an important role in building momentum for that movement.212 There
appear to be roughly three stages to the shareholders' role in this regard.
First, shareholders draw attention to an important issue by submitting a
proposal. As Proffitt and Spicer note, the submission of shareholder
proposals "focus[es] managerial attention publicly and officially" on a given
issue.213 The submission also serves to focus the attention of other
shareholders and the broader community.
Second, shareholders' use of the proposal process prompts corporations
not only to consider social issues, but also to generate the corporation's
position on those issues. In other words, such proposals stimulate both
dialogue and a corporate response to a particular issue. 214 Indeed, the proxy
rules provide for corporations to respond to shareholder proposals.215 Hence,
corporations either must provide a reason for excluding a shareholder
proposal or offer a recommendation if the proposal is included in the
company's proxy statement.216 In either case, this means that corporations
must consider and generate a position on the issue. 217 In this way,
shareholders force corporations to, at least rhetorically, address social issues,
210 See Austin & Taylor, supra note 194, at 26.
211 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 166. Shareholder proposals submitted
between 1969 and 2003 were analyzed for the study. Proffitt and Spicer defined social
issues as proposals that urged corporations to pay attention to their social responsibilities
to the various constituents impacted by their behavior. See id.
212 See id.
213 Id. at 173.
214 See id. (noting that shareholder proposals focus corporate managers to generate
de facto policy positions on important social issues).
215 See Pahiter, supra note 28, at 886-92.
216 See id.
217 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 173 (noting that management statements
serve as de facto policy positions).
2008]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
thereby operating as a disclosure forum.2 18 And they do so in a public
forum.219 Moreover, such a process enables management and concerned
shareholders to engage in discussions regarding the most appropriate
business solutions to the given issues raised.
Third, shareholders help legitimize an issue either by ensuring that the
issue remains on the corporate radar screen or by learning how best to frame
the issue in order to gain a broader level of support. Sometimes shareholders
help legitimize an issue simply through repeated submissions or by
expanding the number of corporations receiving such proposals. 220 This
process increases the visibility of the issue and thus its ultimate legitimacy.
Indeed, Proffitt and Spicer found that proposals are more likely to be
successful after repeated introductions of a proposal on a similar theme.221
More often, however, shareholders create legitimacy by learning how to
reframe an issue so that it appeals to a broader audience. What emerges from
this refraining is a generalized solution to a particular problem.222 Thus,
Proffitt and Spicer note that social proposals often evolve from a host of
individual claims regarding a particular issue to a narrow set of concerns that
can be generalized. 223 In this way, the proposal process serves as a vehicle
for shareholders to organize and educate themselves regarding the kinds of
issues that resonate with other shareholders and management. This enables
social investors to build coalitions with other investors from socially
responsible investment funds to mutual funds and other institutional
investors.224
Shareholders' efforts regarding labor issues are illustrative of this kind of
process. 225 Shareholders began by targeting specific companies and urging
218 See Palmiter, supra note 28, at 925 (noting that allowing more social proposals
on the corporate proxy statements forces management to "define a position or alert
shareholders to a dimension of their investment they had not considered").
219 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 173.
220 See id. at 175-76 (noting that while an expansion in the number of proposals
reduces their success rate, such expansions heighten the visibility of the issue, which
contributes to the overall success of the campaign).
221 See id. at 167.
222 See id. at 173.
223 See id. at 183.
224 See id. at 178-79.
225 Of course, possibly the most successful shareholder proposal campaign has been
the one focused on divestment from South Africa. In that case, shareholders began
submitting proposals requesting corporations to terminate their activities in South Africa.
Eventually, shareholders shifted tactics, requesting that corporations generate detailed
reports of their activities in South Africa and their impact on the South African
community. See Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 179, at 677-80. Support for these kinds of
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them to halt unfair labor practices. 226 However, such requests were difficult
to implement and hence garnered very little corporate or shareholder
support. 227 Eventually, shareholders recognized a more generalized response
to the problem, and thus began requesting that corporations adopt codes of
conduct and otherwise provide better disclosure on labor conditions. 228 Such
tactics not only have garnered support from a broader spectrum of
shareholders, but also have prompted a more favorable response from
corporate managers, generated better disclosure on the issue, and have
focused corporate attention on finding solutions to the problem. 229 Given the
complexity of the labor problem, this can be viewed as a success.
As this suggests, shareholders' efforts to advance stakeholder-related
concerns can influence corporate policy. Indeed, Proffit and Spicer explain
that while social shareholders have little hope of directly influencing the
corporation on their own, their activism has a more long-term trajectory. 230
From this perspective, shareholders represent a critical component of the
campaign to advance other concerns, helping both to produce and to shape
the stakeholder-oriented agenda. Obviously, this process does not generate
success for all issues. In fact, some issues never receive more than small
levels of support or visibility.231 But this evidence reveals that shareholders,
through their proposal rights, play a key role in ensuring that management
focuses on stakeholder concerns.
Perhaps most importantly, this evidence reveals that shareholders do not
impact merely isolated issues, but can genuinely influence corporate policy
on an on-going basis. Indeed, the evidence reveals that shareholders'
proposal strategies have evolved into requests for corporate implementation
of policies that ensure a more lasting impact on stakeholders.232 For example,
with respect to environmental issues, shareholders initially requested that
corporations halt particular undesirable practices. 233 However, shareholders
now submit proposals encouraging corporations to generate reports
reports increased from 25% in the mid-1980s to almost 70% in the early 1990s. See
Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 174-75. This kind of support and the attention
generated by shareholder activism represented one of the primary reasons why
corporations began to sever ties with South Africa.
226 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 173.
227 See id.
228 See id
229 See id.
230 See id. at 174.
231 See id. (noting that some campaigns end because they fail or move into
alternative venues).
232 See discussion supra pages 91-92.
233 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 173-74.
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concerning the environmental impact of their actions and the manner in
which corporate practices may be tailored to promote sustainability. 234 A
similar phenomenon has developed with respect to labor issues as
shareholders have learned to frame their proposal requests for improved
labor practices in terms of requests for robust disclosure regarding such
practices and implementation of effective workplace codes of conduct.235
Such measures ensure that corporate response is not short-term or issue-
specific, but rather that corporate officers and directors maintain their efforts
on behalf of stakeholders. In this regard, shareholders have a powerful
impact on stakeholder-oriented corporate policies in the long-term.
Shareholder democracy should serve to augment this impact.
D. Differentiating Among Stakeholder Beneficiaries
It is probable that shareholder democracy will benefit some stakeholders
more than others. Most references to stakeholders appear to treat them as a
single group with uniform interests. Instead, there are a number of different
stakeholders including customers, creditors, employees, and the community.
These groups have different and sometimes conflicting interests.236
The empirical evidence suggests that some of these groups benefit more
from shareholder democracy than others who may not benefit at all.
Specifically, my research did not reveal any evidence that shareholders
advocate on behalf of creditors. Indeed, none of the empirical evidence I
uncovered revealed that shareholders submit proposals aimed specifically at
enhancing the welfare of creditors.237 Thus, it is not likely that creditors will
benefit from any enhanced shareholder power.
234 See id.
235 See id.
236 Some may contend that the fact that stakeholders have varied, and sometimes
conflicting, interests undermines directors' and officers' ability to advance those
interests. However, this Article disagrees with that assertion. Instead, this fact just means
that corporate officers and directors must weigh and balance each of these stakeholder
interests when crafting corporate policies. While this may appear to be a difficult
endeavor, it is instead precisely what directors and officers are charged to do on a daily
basis. Indeed, given the diversity of interests associated with shareholders, it is very
similar to the weighing and balancing that must occur with regard to shareholders.
Moreover, it is arguable that allowing shareholders some role in identifying those
stakeholder concerns that they believe should be pursued may assist corporate officers
and directors in carrying out their responsibilities.
237 See infra notes 238-51 and accompanying text (revealing evidence of
shareholder proposals on various social issues impacting groups including consumers and
employees, but no corresponding evidence on issues that impact creditors).
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By contrast, the empirical evidence suggests that employees should
benefit from increased shareholder power. Studies suggest that employee-
friendly and labor-friendly policies appeal to shareholders. 238 Then too, data
regarding shareholder proposals reveals that employee-related matters are
frequent subjects of such proposals.239 Shareholder proposals focused on
workers include calls to buttress anti-discrimination policies240 as well as
requests to implement and strengthen workplace codes of conduct.241 Then
too, these proposals often receive a significant percentage of the shareholder
vote. 242 Given the concern for employees reflected in the amount of
submissions and the level of support associated with employee-related
shareholder proposals, it is likely that shareholders will use their increased
power to advance employees' interests.
Similarly, shareholders appear to have interests that coincide with those
of consumers and customers. Hence, shareholders are concerned with
protecting the corporation's brand and products, a concern that resonates
with consumers and customers. 243 Then too, historically shareholders have
submitted numerous proposals involving consumer health and safety issues,
often targeting companies with products viewed as unhealthy or unsafe.244
For example, in 2004, Disney shareholders requested a report on park safety
238 See Faleye & Trahan, supra note 202, at 24 (finding that shareholders value
corporate concern for workers).
239 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 170-72 (revealing that shareholders
historically have used the proposal process to address employment and labor issues both
within the United States and abroad).
240 See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 33-34 (pinpointing increased
proposals, equal opportunity measures, and implementation of sexual orientation anti-
bias policies); 2005 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 45, at 42 (noting increased
efforts aimed at anti-discrimination policies); 2004 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note
36, at 32-33 (noting efforts to adopt anti-discrimination policies that extend to sexual
orientation as well as efforts to enhance diversity in the boardroom).
241 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 170-72; see also 2006 PROXY SEASON
REPORT, supra note 1, at 32 (noting focus on global labor standards); 2005 PROXY
SEASON REPORT, supra note 45, at 44-45 (noting shareholders' efforts at encouraging
companies to develop and implement codes of conduct); 2004 PROXY SEASON REPORT,
supra note 36, at 29.
242 See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 33-34 (showing strong
shareholder support for employee-related policies at various companies including Exxon
Mobil, Amsouth Bancorp, and Lockheed Martin); 2005 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra
note 45, at 42, 45 (revealing strong support for proposals at Emerson Electric Company,
Exxon Mobil, Boeing Co., and Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc.).
243 See Ribstein, supra note 164, at 1452-54.
244 See 2005 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 45, at 48-49; 2004 PROXY SEASON
REPORT, supra note 36, at 31-32; see also Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 171 (noting
shareholder proposals' historical focus on health and safety issues).
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standards in an effort to boost and maintain customer safety within the
company's various amusement parks.245 Like those involving employees,
such proposals have generated significant support at various companies.246
Investors also have exhibited significant concern for the community and
broader society. For example, in 2007, the social issues that received the
most attention from shareholders were those centered on environmental
concerns that impact the community. 247 Hence, shareholders submitted more
social proposals on sustainability and energy efficiency than any other type
of proposal. 248 Similarly, in 2004 and 2005, shareholders submitted a record
number of proposals focused on the impact of toxic chemicals and
greenhouse gas emissions on local communities. 249 This pattern is consistent
with the historical data, which reveals that issues regarding energy and the
environment often dominate the social proposal agenda. 250 These issues also
draw strong support from shareholders. 251 Such support should only expand
if shareholders obtain greater power within the corporation. Shareholders'
advocacy on behalf of the community coupled with their efforts on behalf of
employees and consumers reveals that many, but not all, stakeholders should
benefit from increased shareholder power.
E. Concluding Assessments
This Part demonstrates not only that shareholders have interests that are
compatible with other stakeholders, but also that they act on those interests in
ways that influence corporate practices both short-term and long-term. Such
a demonstration suggests that increased shareholder power may serve the
interests of stakeholders. This Part also points out that stakeholders whose
interests do not align with shareholders' interests may not benefit from
shareholder empowerment. However, because the vast majority of
stakeholders have interests that collide with shareholders, this Part reveals
that on the whole, increased shareholder power should have positive
repercussions for stakeholders.
245 See 2004 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 36, at 32.
246 See id.
247 See 2007 WATCH LIST, supra note 82.
248 See id.
249 See 2005 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 45, at 43; 2004 PROXY SEASON
REPORT, supra note 36, at 30-31.
250 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 171.
251 See 2004 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 36, at 29.
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III. SOME NOTES OF CAUTION
Of course, enhancing shareholder power will not necessarily lead to the
advancement of stakeholder issues. Indeed, there are some factors that may
undermine the extent to which a regime of increased shareholder power will
benefit stakeholders. This Part pinpoints some of the most important of those
factors, and discusses the extent to which they can be mitigated.
A. Bolstering the Shareholder Primacy Norm
It is entirely possible that increasing shareholder power could lead
directors and officers to believe that their primary, if not exclusive,
obligation is to focus on shareholders and their profit-making concerns. In
corporate law, there has been a long-standing debate regarding the proper
aims of corporate managers. 252 Some endorse the "shareholder primacy"
norm, which maintains that corporate managers should focus primarily, if not
exclusively, on maximizing shareholder profit.253 Others support the "social
entity" or "stakeholder" theory of the firm, which maintains that corporate
managers should seek to maximize the interests of all the constituents
impacted by the corporation. 254 While most scholars appear to agree on the
252 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office:
Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1999) (noting that the issues have been
debated ad nauseam); William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business
Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264 (1992) (explaining the competing
conceptions of corporate law that have dominated our society).
253 See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note,
45 HARv. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932) (arguing that corporations exist to enhance
shareholder profit).
254 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147-48 (1932) (pinpointing corporation's responsibilities to all
corporate constituents and broader society); see also William W. Bratton, The Economic
Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 180, 208-15 (1992)
(discussing stakeholder theory); Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as Mediating
Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173, 184-86 (1997).
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dominance of the shareholder primacy norm,255 others contend that it is
neither normatively nor descriptively accurate.256
Increasing shareholder power appears to strengthen the legitimacy of the
shareholder primacy norm. Indeed, shifting power into the hands of
shareholders suggests that corporate managers should be accountable only to
shareholders. It therefore also suggests that corporate managers should not
have discretion to focus on non-shareholders. From this perspective, adopting
a regime of increased shareholder power appears to settle the debate
regarding the proper aims of corporate managers in favor of shareholder
primacy.
In so doing, it also may cause directors and officers to believe that they
do not have the flexibility to focus on stakeholders. Indeed, the shareholder
primacy norm, at least in its strictest sense, appears to suggest that corporate
managers should not take into account the interests of other constituents,
particularly when those interests collide with shareholders' profit
concerns.257 To be sure, this suggestion may be precisely what advocates of
shareholder power intend to result from a regime of shareholder democracy.
Indeed, as other scholars have recognized, corporate law allows managers
considerable flexibility in carrying out their fiduciary duties, pursuant to
which managers have discretion to attend to a variety of different interests. 258
Even in a regime of increased shareholder power, corporate law will continue
to allow such flexibility, and hence, managers will continue to have such
discretion.259 However, Bebchuk believes that the principle benefit of
increased shareholder power is the impact it will have on influencing
management's behavior. 260 In other words, Bebchuk believes that increased
power will channel managerial discretion towards shareholders. If this
occurs, directors and officers may feel constrained in their ability to focus on
255 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) ("There is no longer any serious competitor to the
view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder
value."); see also Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating
Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1, 37 (2004) (noting
the dominance of the shareholder primacy norm).
256 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the
Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 406 (2001).
257 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (noting a duty to focus on profit concerns without focus on other interests).
258 See Blair & Stout, supra note 256.
259 Bainbridge has indicated that allowing shareholders greater authority necessarily
intrudes on the power and discretion of directors. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy,
supra note 5, at 1747 (noting that directors cannot be held more accountable without also
undermining their discretion).
260 See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 878.
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issues beyond shareholder wealth maximization. Thus, by strengthening the
normative legitimacy of shareholder primacy, increasing shareholder power
may decrease managers' willingness and ability to pay heed to stakeholders.
Bebchuk appears to dismiss this concern because it presumes that
directors and officers use their discretion to advance stakeholder issues.
Instead, Bebchuk emphasizes the likelihood that directors and officers use
their discretion to advance their own self-serving goals.261 Because he
presumes that managers do not necessarily consider stakeholders' interests,
Bebchuk suggests that stakeholders are not worse off in a regime where such
considerations are discouraged.
While recognizing that managers can and do use their discretion for
improper ends, this Article disagrees with the presumption that such actors
do not also use their discretion to focus on stakeholder concerns. Hence, this
Article contends that it would be extremely problematic if increased
shareholder power resulted in legitimizing the shareholder primacy norm in
its strictest sense.
However, such a result is not inevitable. Indeed, even if increased
shareholder power encourages managers to focus on shareholders, if
shareholders demonstrate a concern for stakeholders, then managers will
come to appreciate that a focus on shareholders includes a commitment to
stakeholders. As Professor Larry Ribstein notes, if shareholders are interested
in issues beyond strict profits, then managers who act in shareholders'
interests must consider such issues, even when they diverge from profit
maximization. 262 In his view, shareholders' interests in these social issues
undercut the belief that managers must be free from shareholder power in
order to pursue the objectives of non-shareholders. 263 Others similarly have
pointed out that when groups successfully mobilize shareholder support on a
social issue, it ensures that boards consider those issues as part of the process
of considering shareholder concerns.264 Shareholder support for these issues
counteracts the notion that maximizing shareholder interests requires strict
adherence to profit concerns.
Then too, the evidence appears to confirm that when shareholders
advance stakeholder-oriented issues, directors and officers feel some
responsibility to focus on them. Hence, Part II revealed that corporations
respond to shareholder proposals regarding other constituents when those
proposals receive a significant portion of the shareholder vote.
261 See id. at 911.
262 See Ribstein, supra note 164, at 1442 ("[M]anagers who are accountable to
shareholders have significant incentives to maximize social wealth rather than just
accounting profits.").
263 See id.
264 See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 35, at 1089-90.
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Of course, this observation suggests that stakeholders' claims may not be
adequately addressed if shareholders do not support them. Hence, in a regime
of increased shareholder power, stakeholders must pay added attention to
building coalitions with shareholders. Interestingly, the evidence suggests
that this dynamic is already occurring. Thus, proxy data reveals that
stakeholders and their advocates have paid particular attention to building
broader levels of support by shaping their claims in terms of shareholder
value. Such a strategy will be especially important in a system of expanded
shareholder democracy.
B. Prioritizing Stakeholder Concerns
A second potential concern relates to the fact that social issues do not
receive as much shareholder support as other corporate governance proposals
that are linked to profit. In fact, historically such issues have fared less well
than governance matters. 265 Moreover, even though support for such
measures has increased within the last few years, that support lags behind the
level of support received for governance matters.266 This relatively low level
of support for stakeholder-oriented issues may signal that shareholders view
such issues as less important, thereby suggesting that such issues should be
subordinated.
This is likely an accurate assessment of shareholders' interests. In other
words, it is probably true that while shareholders are concerned about issues
pertaining to other stakeholders, they do not want such issues to overwhelm
the corporation and its ability to generate firm value. For those who support
the shareholder primacy norm, the fact that these issues receive less support
may prove comforting because it suggests that they are given their proper
weight within the corporate framework.
On the one hand, this fact does not negate shareholders' ability to serve
as allies for stakeholders. Indeed, Part II revealed that shareholders can and
do play a critical role in advancing the concerns of other constituents. In fact,
there are some issues where shareholder support has been fairly significant.
At the very least then, shareholder support can identify for management
those issues that shareholders believe merit attention as well as those issues
that should supercede profit concerns. As some scholars argue, obtaining
shareholder input may provide managers with useful cues regarding how best
to balance such interests. 267
On the other hand, the relatively low level of support stakeholder
proposals receive reveals that the alliance between shareholders and
265 See 2004 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 36, at 28.
266 See id.
267 See Matheson & Olson, supra note 151, at 1488-89.
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stakeholders has its limits. In other words, it suggests that stakeholders
cannot rely solely on shareholders to advance their claims. Indeed, the
interests of shareholders and stakeholders do not always align. Stakeholders
must become adept at learning to use their alliance with shareholders to
exploit areas of commonality, while recognizing those areas pursuant to
which other strategies must be employed.
C. Special Interests Shareholders and their Power to Exploit
One concern that several scholars have emphasized is the potential that
granting shareholders enhanced power will give certain investors a greater
ability to advance their own special, personal interests at the expense of the
corporation as a whole. Thus, Bainbridge has expressed concern that
increased shareholder power would simply provide investors more concerned
with political interests than economic ones with greater leverage.268 In fact, it
appears that some of the most active shareholders are particularly susceptible
to political influence. Hence, Professor Roberta Romano points out that
public pension funds face intense political pressure to focus on narrow
personal and social issues.269 Other scholars similarly pinpoint the tendency
of investors such as public pensions and labor unions to pursue their own
interests without regard to how they impact the corporation as a whole.270
For example, there is some evidence that labor unions initiate shareholder
proposals after failed talks with management.271 This evidence suggests that
increasing shareholder power will only augment the ability of certain
investors to advance their narrow political or personal goals.
One easy response to this concern is that investors who seek to advance
their own narrow self-interests are not likely to get the support of other
shareholders, whose support may be necessary to capture the attention of
corporate managers. In other words, in order to capture the attention of
management, shareholder proposals must receive significant support from
shareholders. This means that investors must garner the support of their
fellow shareholders. 27 2 Such support is not likely to be forthcoming if an
268 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 5, at 1754.
269 See Romano, supra note 175, at 811-12 (noting the distinction between public
and private funds and the pressure public funds face to focus on local and/or social
issues).
270 See Frank S. Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and
Financial Innovation 5 (Brookings-Nomura Papers on Financial Services, Working Paper
Mp. 06-21, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-931254.
271 See id. at 14; Schwab & Thomas, supra note 35, at 1022-23.
272 See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 270, at 14-15; Schwab & Thomas, supra
note 35, at 1035-36, 1082-83 (noting that labor initiatives cannot succeed without the
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investor seeks to advance her own narrow personal agenda.273 Instead,
investors will gravitate towards those issues that enhance the overall health
of the corporation or that a broad range of shareholders otherwise view as
important. 274 This suggests that shareholder democracy will weed out all but
the most value enhancing initiatives, undercutting shareholders' ability to
advance their personal agenda.
Unfortunately, such a suggestion is not entirely satisfactory. Indeed, even
Bebchuk acknowledges that shareholders' influence will stem primarily from
indirect channels-that is, shareholders' increased power will translate into
an enhanced ability to negotiate with directors rather than an augmented
ability to garner majority support for their initiatives.275 In such a regime, an
investor's ability to garner the support of other investors may be important,
but is not critical to the success of the investor's campaign. Instead, the fact
that shareholders have increased power will serve to pressure directors and
officers to more readily comply with investors' wishes. Indeed, management
may concede to investors' demands to avoid the costs and negative publicity
associated with a drawn-out battle with shareholders. This may be
particularly true in today's post-Enron environment where the public has less
confidence in business leaders, and prosecutors have been more willing to
hold such leaders accountable for corporate failings. Hence, it seems realistic
to presume that increased shareholder power will allow some investors to
advance their personal agendas.
In fact, such an occurrence seems to be an inevitable by-product of
enhanced shareholder power. While this concern may not undercut the
propriety of shareholder democracy, it does merit special recognition so that
strategies can be developed to mitigate this potential for abuse. In this regard,
we should be mindful of the fact that while there may be instances in which
shareholders have been able to advance their own narrow concerns, there
also appear to be occasions where corporate managers have successfully
thwarted such efforts. What does this mean with regard to stakeholders?
On the one hand, there may be some reason to believe that this problem
is especially acute in the context of investors seeking to advance stakeholder
interests. First, the discussion thus far, which highlights the potential for
support of other shareholders, which will not emerge unless they relate to issues that have
the potential to improve corporate performance); Battling for Corporate America, supra
note 104, at 71 ("[P]olitically motivated shareholders and hedge funds are likely to gain
any real power over management only if they can persuade the usually passive majority
to support them.").
273 See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 270, at 14-15; Schwab & Thomas, supra
note 35, at 1035-36, 1082-83; Battling for Corporate America, supra note 104, at 71.
274 See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 35, at 1041-42.
275 See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 878.
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social investors to advance their claim within a regime of increased
shareholder power, likely confirms fears that shareholder democracy will
lead to the advancement of personal interests at the expense of corporate
concerns. Indeed, social investors appear to be the group most likely to
advance interests at odds with the overall welfare of the corporation. In fact,
many such investors, such as faith-based institutions, take positions in
corporations with the sole purpose of advancing some broader societal
concern, which may not necessarily resonate with the rest of the shareholder
body. In this regard, this Article may confirm the notion that shareholder
democracy will bolster investors' ability to advance issues of little concern to
corporate well-being.
Second, social investors need less shareholder support to gain legitimacy
for their concerns, undermining the extent to which other shareholders can
serve as a filter for such concerns. Indeed, because social proposals tend to
receive a smaller percentage of the shareholder vote, proxy analysts
acknowledge that such investors measure their success in terms of support
levels that are less than a majority. Hence, some analysts define success in
terms of proposals that receive more than 20% of the vote,276 while others
view 10% of the shareholder vote as a sign of success.277 Analysts suggest
that once the level of shareholder support surpasses these thresholds, there is
a greater likelihood that corporate managers will pay heed to them.278 This
suggests that such investors do not need the broad support of shareholders in
order to press their claims, increasing the likelihood that such investors will
be able to advance issues that do not resonate with the corporation as a
whole.
Then too, the fact that a principal strategy of stakeholder-oriented
investors is to seek a negotiated resolution with management also may
enhance their ability to influence corporate practices. Hence, social investors
also view success in terms of the number of withdrawn proposals that occur
within a given proxy season because withdrawal rates suggest increased
dialogue with managers. As Part II revealed, such withdrawals have occurred
with greater frequency in recent years. The fact that many proposals never
reach a vote bolsters the notion that shareholders' tendency to abuse their
influence will not be curtailed by other investors. Indeed, Proffitt and Spicer
note that the rate of withdrawn proposals does not necessarily signal success
in terms of the campaign's ability to advance a social issue of concern to the
corporation more generally. 279 Instead, such withdrawn proposals may
suggest that investors have been able to extract some personal gain from the
276 See 2004 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 36, at 28.
277 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 173-74.
278 See id.
279 See id. at 174.
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corporation.280 Because these negotiated withdrawals are private, it is not
clear if this is in fact the result. In this regard, stakeholder-oriented investors
may be uniquely positioned to take advantage of their increased power to
advance policies that do not benefit the corporation as a whole.
On the other hand, a realistic assessment of the historical proxy data
suggests that such investors' ability to exploit corporate managers may be
overblown. First, the evidence indicates that corporations are more likely to
seek exclusions of social proposals than any other kind of proposal. 281 This
suggests that corporations are more willing to discount the importance of
these proposals. Such a suggestion is confirmed by other scholars who
observe that managers are particularly suspicious of, and hostile towards,
proposals submitted by social investors. 282 Second, other investors tend to be
especially suspicious of the motives of social investors, which should bolster
management's willingness to reject concerns raised by them.283 Third,
empirical evidence suggests that the SEC is more likely to allow corporations
to exclude proposals submitted by social investors.284 This should bolster
managers' confidence in challenging such proposals. Moreover, it suggests
that while such proposals may not need majority support, they appear to be
subject to some of the most intense scrutiny from corporate managers,
shareholders, and the SEC. The resistance that such proposals receive
increases the likelihood that only those proposals with broad-based appeal
achieve success. Indeed, the empirical evidence reveals that social proposals
tend to achieve success (even success in terms of a negotiated withdrawal or
surpassing 10-20% of the vote) only after extended efforts at coalition
building and repeated proposal submissions. 285 By contrast, many admittedly
narrow and personal shareholder proposals either are routinely excluded or
receive infinitesimal percentages of the shareholder vote. In this regard, we
may be the least concerned with activism by social investors. Illustrative of
this hypothesis, proxy analysts consistently have emphasized that social
investors' recent success stems from their ability to find common ground
with other traditional investors and develop agendas that focus more broadly
on firm value.
2 80 See id.
281 See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
282 See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 35, at 1041-42 (noting that investors must
overcome the hostility of management).
283 See id. at 1036.
284 See Palmiter, supra note 28, at 913-14.
285 See Proffitt & Spicer, supra note 13, at 178-79.
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D. The Danger of Hedge Funds
Another concern is that the kinds of shareholders who are most active
may have interests diametrically opposed to stakeholders. Specifically, hedge
funds have been very active in this new campaign for shareholder
democracy.286 Hedge funds tend to have greater success than traditional
shareholders because they have greater resources, financial innovation, and
flexibility.287 Indeed, hedge funds have moved beyond using the shareholder
proposal process and have sought to negotiate directly with management.
Moreover, hedge funds often couple their voting campaign with a threat of a
proxy contest for corporate control. 288 This threat dramatically increases their
bargaining position. As a result, hedge funds have been successful at
impacting corporate policies.
Unfortunately, hedge funds are not the kinds of shareholders who are
likely to advance stakeholder issues. Instead, hedge funds tend to have very
short-term horizons. 289 If these are the kinds of shareholders who are most
likely to use increased shareholder power, then that increase will not prove
beneficial to stakeholders.
This observation does not mean that all shareholder power is bad for
stakeholders; rather it suggests that such power can be problematic in the
hands of certain shareholders. As a result, we need to monitor the types of
shareholders who wield power. To this end, it. is noteworthy that social
investors have experienced success even as hedge funds have increased their
activism.290 Then too, some corporations, in the face of considerable
pressure, have effectively resisted hedge fund efforts that corporate managers
perceive as detrimental to the corporation's best interests. 291 This suggests
that managers as well as stakeholders can counteract less productive forces.
IV. CONCLUSION
Shareholder democracy is on the rise. Thus, shareholders have submitted
a record number of proposals on a variety of different governance initiatives,
286 See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 270, at 22. For a definition of hedge funds,
see id. at 23.
287 See id. at 22.
28 8 See id. at 49.
289 See id. at 22.
290 See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
291 See, e.g., Micheline Maynard & Nick Bunkley, One Threat Averted but More
Await GM, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2006, at CI; Micheline Maynard, Kerkorian Retreats
from GM, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2006, at CI (noting GM's success in resisting the efforts
of hedge fund manager Kirk Kerkorian).
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and those proposals have garnered a record level of shareholder support. This
support has prompted corporations to alter their governance policies, while
prompting legislatures to alter corporate law to ensure the legitimacy and
effectiveness of these policies.
Shareholder democracy has not been greeted with enthusiasm by the
corporate community. Certainly, some welcome increased shareholder power
as an appropriate and effective mechanism for ensuring greater managerial
accountability and, hence, improving corporate value. Yet others express
reservations about the propriety and potential effectiveness of shareholder
democracy. Most notably, Professor Bainbridge asks, given the historical
success of the American business model, why should we dramatically alter
it? In fact, a centralized decision-making regime with limited shareholder
power is a necessary and effective feature of efficient corporate governance.
Others, however, question the legitimacy of shareholder democracy
based on its potential to hinder the advancement of concerns associated with
stakeholders. Indeed, shifting power into the hands of shareholders has the
potential to ensure that such power is used only in the pursuit of short-term
financial gain, without regard to the interests of other corporate constituents.
Yet, this Article maintains that this objection to shareholder democracy
is flawed. Instead, there are shareholders who have interests that align with
stakeholders. Moreover, the empirical evidence indicates that those
shareholders not only actively seek to advance the concerns of stakeholders,
but also build support for those concerns so that they garner the attention of
corporate managers and other more traditional shareholders. Such support
ensures that shareholders play a critical role in shaping long-term corporate
policy on behalf of stakeholders. Hence, the empirical evidence confirms the
notion that shareholders can and will be effective allies for stakeholders.
To be sure, there are some stakeholders, such as creditors, that may not
benefit from shareholder empowerment. Indeed, shareholders tend to
gravitate towards employees, consumers, and the community. Hence, such
groups can expect that shareholders will use their enhanced power to enhance
corporate focus on their concerns. In this regard, many, but not all,
stakeholders may view shareholder democracy as a positive development.
In addition, there are many factors that may hinder shareholders' ability
to be effective advocates for stakeholders. Nonetheless, these concerns do
not detract from the possibility that increased shareholder power can benefit
a large variety of stakeholders.
Perhaps most importantly, if some form of increased shareholder power
is inevitable, then stakeholders must assess how and to what extent that
power can be used for their benefit. Indeed, Professor Bebchuk would like to
dismiss stakeholders completely from the debate regarding shareholder
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democracy and relegate them to the role of bystander. 292 However, if
stakeholders desire to have an effective voice in this seemingly new
corporate governance regime, they should resist that diminished role. Instead,
stakeholders need to affirmatively assess the ways in which this new
democracy not only increases the rights of shareholders, but also enhances
the interests of all corporate constituents.
292 See Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 912.
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